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UNIVERSITY  OF CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY 
Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  A  New 
Test  in  the  Spirit  of  Friedman  and 
Schwartz 
1. Introduction 
This paper  investigates  whether  nominal  disturbances  have  important 
real effects.  What differentiates  the paper from the countless  others  on 
the same  subject is that it focuses  not on purely  statistical evidence  but 
on evidence  derived  from the historical record-evidence  based on what 
we call the "narrative approach." This approach was pioneered  by Fried- 
man and Schwartz  in their Monetary History of the United States and has 
provided  the evidence  that we suspect  has been most important in shap- 
ing economists'  beliefs about the real effects of monetary shocks. Despite 
its  significance,  however,  the  narrative approach  has  been  largely  ne- 
glected in formal research in the 25 years since Friedman and Schwartz's 
work.  In this paper we both assess  the evidence  presented  in the Mone- 
tary History and,  more  importantly,  conduct  a test  of the link between 
monetary  disturbances  and real output  for the postwar  United States in 
the spirit of Friedman and Schwartz's  approach. 
The reason  that purely  statistical tests,  such  as regressions  of output 
on  money,  studies  of  the  effects  of  "anticipated" and  "unanticipated" 
money,  and vector  autoregressions,  probably have  not played  a crucial 
role in forming  most  economists'  views  about the real effects  of mone- 
tary disturbances  is that  such  procedures  cannot  persuasively  identify 
the direction of causation.  On the one hand,  if firms that are planning  to 
expand  their output  first increase  their demands  for liquid assets  (or for 
loans  from  commercial  banks),  money  could  rise  before  output  rises 
even  though  money  had  no  causal  role  (King and  Plosser  1984; Tobin 122 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
1965).  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Federal  Reserve  were  actively  using 
monetary  policy  to  offset  the  effects  of  other  factors acting  to change 
output,  there might  be no discernible  relation between  money  and out- 
put even though  money  had large real effects (Kareken and Solow  1963). 
The Narrative  Approach.  The approach that we  suspect  in fact underlies 
most economists'  beliefs concerning  whether  nominal disturbances mat- 
ter is quite different  from any purely  statistical approach.  We call it the 
narrative  approach  because  its  central  element  is  the  identification  of 
"monetary shocks" through  non-statistical  procedures.  Whether carried 
out systematically  or casually, the  method  involves  using  the historical 
record, such as the descriptions  of the process  and reasoning  that led to 
decisions  by the monetary authority and accounts of the sources of mone- 
tary disturbances,  to identify  episodes  when  there were  large shifts  in 
monetary  policy or in the behavior of the monetary  sector that were not 
driven  by  developments  on  the  real side  of  the  economy.  The  test  of 
whether  monetary  disturbances  matter is  then  simply  to  see  whether 
output  is unusually  low  following  negative  shocks  of this type and un- 
usually  high following  positive  shocks. 
In their Monetary History, Friedman and Schwartz argue that the study 
of U.S.  monetary  history  does  indeed  provide  clear examples  of large, 
independent  monetary  disturbances.  They argue further that economic 
developments  subsequent  to the disturbances they identify provide over- 
whelming  evidence  that  monetary  shocks  have  large real effects.  Evi- 
dence  of the same  kind,  gathered  and analyzed  less  systematically  than 
that presented  by Friedman and Schwartz,  is also often cited in support 
of  the  view  that  monetary  policy  matters.  References  to  the  "Volcker 
deflation"  represent  a common  example  of this type  of argument.  It is 
frequently  argued  that the fact that the commitment  by the Federal Re- 
serve in 1979 to a highly  contractionary monetary  policy to reduce infla- 
tion was  followed  by the most  severe  recession  in postwar  U.S.  history 
provides  powerful  evidence  of the real effects  of monetary  policy. Both 
this  casual  analysis  and  the  more  systematic  analysis  of Friedman and 
Schwartz  have  probably  been  more  persuasive  than  purely  statistical 
studies  because  the  isolation  of  shocks  from  the  historical  record can 
overcome  the reverse  causation  problem  that plagues  any regression  of 
output  on money.1 
While the narrative approach has many virtues, implementing  it is not 
straightforward.  There  are  two  specific  problems  that  must  be  ad- 
dressed.  The  first and  more  important  possible  difficulty  involves  the 
1. Summers  (1987) provides  a cogent  discussion  of the persuasiveness  of narrative studies. Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  123 
isolation  of monetary  shocks.  Inherently,  there cannot  be a completely 
mechanical rule for determining  when  the historical record indicates that 
a shock  has  occurred.  Moreover,  the  identification  of shocks  generally 
occurs  retrospectively,  and  thus  the  researcher  may  know  the  subse- 
quent  behavior  of  money  and  output.  The  fact  that  the  selection  of 
disturbances  is judgmental  and  retrospective  introduces  the possibility 
that there  may  be  an unconscious  bias toward,  for example,  searching 
harder for negative  monetary  shocks in periods preceding sharp declines 
in money  and output  than in other periods.  Such a bias could cause one 
to misclassify  shocks  and  to conclude  that monetary  disturbances  had 
real consequences  when  they had none. 
The  second  potential  difficulty  arises  in  determining  whether  the 
shocks  that are identified  are followed  by unusual  output  movements. 
Neither  Friedman  and  Schwartz  nor  those  who  cite  similar  informal 
evidence  in  support  of  the  importance  of  monetary  disturbances  test 
formally whether  the behavior  of output  in the aftermath of the distur- 
bances that they identify  is in fact systematically  unusual.  Indeed,  Fried- 
man and Schwartz explicitly deny  that monetary  shocks have consistent 
and precise real consequences,  arguing their effects occur with long and 
variable lags.  Carried to an extreme,  an absence  of statistical tests and a 
belief in irregular and often  quite long  lags could render the hypothesis 
that monetary shocks have important real effects void of testable implica- 
tions.  More moderately,  these  factors could  cause  the strength  and sig- 
nificance of the effect to be overstated,  and could compound  the effects 
of biases in the selection  of shocks. 
Overview.  This discussion  of the benefits  and dangers  of the narrative 
approach  leads  us  to  believe  that  to  answer  the  question  of  whether 
nominal disturbances  have real effects,  the narrative approach should be 
used,  but that it should  be used  carefully and systematically. That is the 
goal of this paper. 
We pursue  that goal in two ways.  The first is by reexamining Friedman 
and Schwartz's  evidence  concerning  the real effects of monetary  policy, 
particularly  their  identification  of  monetary  disturbances.  Despite  the 
immense  importance  of  their work  in forming  economists'  views  con- 
cerning  the  real effects  of monetary  forces,  little research has been  de- 
voted  to the question  of how  successful  Friedman and Schwartz in fact 
are in  isolating  independent  monetary  disturbances.  In Section  2  we 
therefore investigate  whether  there appears to be any unintended  bias in 
Friedman and Schwartz's  choices  of monetary  shocks.2 We also use this 
2. Many other authors have explored various aspects of Friedman and Schwartz's work. To 
cite  only  a  few  of  the  most  prominent  examples,  Temin  (1976),  Gordon  and  Wilcox 124 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
critical analysis of the Monetary  History to suggest  improvements  to Fried- 
man and Schwartz's  techniques. 
The second  and  more important  way  in which  we  pursue  the narra- 
tive  approach  is by  proposing  and  implementing  a test  using  this  ap- 
proach for the  postwar  United  States.  Friedman and Schwartz,  writing 
in the early 1960s, necessarily  focused  on the period before World War 
II. We argue,  however,  that  the  postwar  era provides  a better  setting 
for employing  their approach.  In particular, we  argue that it is possible 
to  come  much  closer  in  the  postwar  than  in  the  prewar  or interwar 
periods  to the ideal of using  a precise and unambiguous  rule for identi- 
fying  a  central  set  of  major  monetary  disturbances.  Thus  we  believe 
that the postwar  era provides  not just additional,  but superior evidence 
concerning  whether  nominal  shocks  matter. This new  test is the subject 
of  Section  3.  We  describe  the  class  of  disturbances  that  we  wish  to 
identify,  our procedures  for identifying  them,  and our tests  of whether 
the  behavior  of  output  in  the  wake  of  those  disturbances  provides 
evidence  for or against  the view  that nominal  disturbances  have impor- 
tant real consequences. 
Finally, in Section  4 we  return to the evidence  from the interwar era. 
Having discussed  in Section 2 whether Friedman and Schwartz's identifi- 
cation of monetary  disturbances  might involve  some unintended  bias, in 
this section we propose  what we think is a more appropriate list of major 
independent  monetary disturbances for the interwar period. Then, paral- 
leling the test in Section 3, we ask whether  real activity responds  system- 
atically to those  disturbances. 
2. Friedman  and  Schwartz  Challenged 
The purpose  of this section is to examine how  successful  and persuasive 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  are in isolating  independent  monetary  distur- 
bances. We do this for two reasons.  First, because the Monetary  History  has 
been  so influential  in shaping  economists'  beliefs,  it is important to ap- 
proach the work critically and to evaluate anew the quality of the evidence 
that it presents.  Second,  because  the  main  purpose  of our paper is to 
extend  the narrative approach  to the postwar  era, it is useful  to identify 
any potential  shortcomings  in Friedman and Schwartz's classic work so 
that we  can avoid  them in our own  study  of the historical record. 
(1981), and Hamilton (1987) study Friedman and Schwartz's analysis of the Great Depres- 
sion,  and Bordo (1988) assesses  their contributions  to monetary history more generally. 
Hendry  and  Ericsson  (1987) criticize Friedman  and  Schwartz's  econometric  methods, 
focusing  mainly on their later work. Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  125 
2.1 FRIEDMAN  AND SCHWARTZ'S  MAJOR  MONETARY  SHOCKS 
To set the stage,  we begin by describing  the episodes  that Friedman and 
Schwartz  identify  as  the  most  important  monetary  shocks  during  the 
period  covered  by  their book.  In keeping  with  the  view  that the  most 
compelling  evidence  that Friedman and Schwartz provide  of the impor- 
tance of monetary  shocks comes  from the most dramatic events  that they 
describe,  we  limit our attention  to the episodes  they emphasize  in sum- 
marizing their work (1963a, ch. 13; 1963b, pp. 48-55); we do not consider 
the various more minor or less clear cut episodes  that they cite as provid- 
ing  further  evidence  of  the  importance  of  monetary  disturbances.  In 
addition,  we  limit ourselves  to the  shocks  in the period  after 1919. For 
the  period  before  World War I,  all  of  the  shocks  that  Friedman  and 
Schwartz emphasize  are related to financial panics.  We do not focus on 
the panics  both because  the degree  to which  panics represent indepen- 
dent monetary  disturbances  is a particularly complex issue  and because 
Friedman and  Schwartz  place less  emphasis  on the panics  than on the 
interwar shocks.3 
With these  restrictions,  there remain four episodes  that Friedman and 
Schwartz  identify  as  major monetary  shocks.  Three of  these  episodes 
involve  overt actions on the part of the Federal Reserve.  In their chapter 
entitled  "A Summing  Up," Friedman and Schwartz state: 
On three  occasions  the System deliberately  took  policy steps of major  magnitude 
which cannot be regarded  as necessary or inevitable  economic  consequences  of 
contemporary  changes in money income  and prices. Like  the crucial  experiments 
of the physical scientist, the results are so consistent and sharp  as to leave little 
doubt about their interpretation. The dates are January-June 1920,  October 
1931, and June 1936-January 1937 (1963a, p. 688). 
The fourth episode  that Friedman and Schwartz characterize as a major 
monetary shock is the Federal Reserve's inaction in the face of the severe 
economic  downturn  of 1929-31.  They describe the events  of this period 
as representing  "a fourth crucial experiment"  (1963a, p. 694). 
Before  we  sketch  Friedman  and  Schwartz's  interpretations  of  these 
3. We  also exclude the episodes that Friedman  and Schwartz  cite as providing  evidence of 
the effects of monetary  disturbances  on nominal  income, notably  the secular  deflation  of 
1879-1897  and the secular  inflation  of 1897-1914.  In the early  1960s,  when Friedman  and 
Schwartz  wrote, there was widespread  agreement  that shifts in aggregate  demand had 
important  real effects but not that changes in money had important  effects  on aggregate 
demand. Thus to Friedman  and Schwartz,  evidence that  monetary  disturbances  affected 
either output or prices was evidence that "money mattered."  Today,  of course, the 
central  motive for interest in the effects of monetary  disturbances  is the desire to gain 
insight into the question of whether aggregate  demand shocks  have real  effects. 126 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
four episodes,  it is useful  to point  out that by a monetary  shock Fried- 
man  and  Schwartz  do  not mean  a monetary  movement  entirely  unre- 
lated  to underlying  economic  developments.  Instead,  what  they  mean 
by  a  monetary  shock  is  a  movement  that  is  unusual given  economic 
developments-that  is,  a movement  that would  not  have  occurred  in 
other periods  or other  circumstances  given  the  pattern of real activity. 
For the four critical episodes  described  below,  the unusual  movements 
in money  arose, in Friedman and Schwartz's view, from a conjunction of 
economic  events,  monetary  institutions,  and the doctrines and beliefs of 
the time and of the particular individuals  determining  policy. 
January-June  1920.  Despite  high output,  low unemployment,  and con- 
siderable inflation,  monetary  policy  remained  loose  in the aftermath of 
World War I. The major reasons  for this monetary ease included  a desire 
to avoid raising the costs to the Treasury of financing outstanding  debt, a 
desire not to inflict capital losses  on the purchasers  of the final issue  of 
war bonds,  and  a belief  that persuasion  rather than high  interest  rates 
should  be used  to discourage  borrowing.  Then,  in November  1919 the 
Federal  Reserve  tightened  policy  somewhat,  raising  the  discount  rate 
from 4 to 4.75%. In 1920 the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate two 
additional  times,  from 4.75 to 6% in January and from 6 to 7% in June. 
According to Friedman and Schwartz,  there were two central reasons for 
the  adoption  of  this  extraordinarily  restrictive policy  at a time when  a 
downturn  was  in fact already beginning.  The first was  a concern  with 
the  System's  own  reserve  position  rather than with  broader economic 
conditions.  The second  was  the fact-hardly  surprising,  given  the brief 
history of the System-that  the Federal Reserve misunderstood  the lags 
with which  monetary  policy  affected the economy.  As a result,  the Fed- 
eral Reserve repeatedly  tightened  policy before previous restrictions had 
had a chance to have an impact.  (1963a, pp. 221-39.) 
October  1931.  Britain's departure  from the  gold  standard led  to wide- 
spread fears that the United  States would  also leave gold,  and thus to a 
vast  gold  outflow.  The  Federal  Reserve  responded  by  raising  the  dis- 
count rate from 1.5 to 3.5% in two steps  in October 1931. Friedman and 
Schwartz  consider  this  restrictive  policy  highly  unusual  because  the 
economy  was  so severely  depressed  in 1931 and its condition  was  con- 
tinuing  to deteriorate.  (1963a, pp.  315-17,  380-84.) 
June 1936-January 1937.  By 1935 banks had accumulated vast excess re- 
serves.  Federal Reserve  officials believed  that these  excess  reserves  re- 
flected a low  demand  for loans  and that as a result open-market  opera- Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  * 127 
tions  would  for the most  part simply  alter the relative shares of excess 
reserves  and government  bonds  in banks' portfolios.  Motivated  mainly 
by a desire to put the System in a position where it could use open-market 
operations to affect the economy  in the future should it wish to do so, and 
partly by a wish  to respond  to the inflation and rapid output growth that 
had occurred  since  1933, in 1936 and  1937 the Federal Reserve doubled 
reserve requirements  in three steps.  Friedman and Schwartz believe that 
the excess reserves  were in fact a reflection of banks' desire for increased 
liquidity in the aftermath of the widespread  banking panics of 1929-33. 
As a result, the increase in reserve requirements led to a massive contrac- 
tion of lending  as banks  worked  to restore their excess  reserves.  Thus, 
according to Friedman and Schwartz,  the Federal Reserve inadvertently 
caused  a major monetary  contraction because  it misundertood  the mo- 
tives  of bankers.  Furthermore,  they believe  that the unfamiliarity of re- 
serve requirements  as a policy instrument  (the System had been granted 
authority to vary reserve requirements only in 1933) led to an unintention- 
ally large shift in policy, and that the discreteness  of the policy shift made 
reversal politically difficult.  (1963a, pp. 449-62,  515-45.) 
The early stages of the Great Depression.  Friedman  and  Schwartz  argue 
that, beginning  most  likely  with  the evidence  of a severe  downturn  in 
the spring of 1930 and certainly by the time of the first wave  of banking 
failures in late 1930, similar economic  developments  would  not have led 
to such  large declines  in the  money  stock under  the National  Banking 
System,  or under the Federal Reserve either in the 1910s and 1920s or in 
the  post-World  War II era.  They  therefore  conclude  that  despite  the 
absence of any acts of commission  on the part of the Federal Reserve, the 
large fall in money  during  the first year and a half of the Depression- 
before Britain's departure  from the  gold  standard in September  1931- 
represents  a monetary  shock.  (1963a, pp.  308-16,  367-80,  691-94.) 
2.2 IS THERE  BIAS  IN FRIEDMAN  AND SCHWARTZ'S  SELECTION  OF 
MONETARY  SHOCKS? 
Friedman  and  Schwartz's  definition  of  what  constitutes  a  monetary 
shock  or a  "crucial experiment"  is  not  highly  precise:  an  episode  in- 
volves  a monetary  shock if monetary developments  were highly unusual 
given  all of the relevant  developments  on the real side of the economy. 
As a result, Friedman and Schwartz's judgment is central to their identifi- 
cation of shocks;  they  must  weigh  a broad range of factors and decide 
whether  the evidence  as a whole  indicates  that a shock occurred. There 
is therefore a potential  for subtle biasing of the selection of shocks.  If, for 
example,  their hope  was to find evidence  of the importance of monetary 128 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
forces,  they  may  have  had  an unintentional  tendency  to search some- 
what  harder for negative  monetary  shocks  in periods  before  large de- 
clines in economic  activity than at other times. 
In this section  we  argue that this danger is genuine.  We suggest  that 
there  does  appear  to  be  some  unintended  bias  in  Friedman  and 
Schwartz's  choice  of shocks.  This conclusion  is based both on an analy- 
sis  of episodes  that Friedman  and  Schwartz  do  not  identify  as shocks 
and  on  the  consistent  presence  of contractionary  non-monetary  forces 
in the shocks  that they do identify. 
2.2.1  Candidate  Episodes  not Included  by Friedman  and Schwartz.  Suppose 
that Friedman and Schwartz had a tendency  to search more carefully for 
"exogenous"  negative  monetary  shocks  before  times  of  large  falls  in 
output  than  at other  times.  One  would  then  expect  there to be events 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  did  not  include  in  their  list  of  independent 
negative  monetary  disturbances  that it is reasonable to think they would 
have included  had those  events  been followed  by significant declines  in 
output.  We believe  that  there  are  two  such  episodes  in  the  interwar 
period. 
1933.  A massive  wave  of banking failures began in the final months  of 
1932 and worsened  in early 1933. In addition,  expectations  that Roose- 
velt might devalue  or abandon  the gold standard on taking office caused 
large gold outflows  and led to an increase in the discount rate from 2.5 to 
3.5% in February to defend  gold.  By February banking  conditions  had 
degenerated  into  panic,  causing  widespread  bank failures.  The failures 
were  in  turn  followed  by  the  declaration  of  bank  holidays  in  many 
states.  On his inauguration  in March, Roosevelt  imposed  a nationwide 
banking  holiday-a  step  that,  in  Friedman  and  Schwartz's  view,  was 
extraordinarily disruptive  of the financial system  and much more drastic 
than was  needed.  (Friedman and  Schwartz  1963a, pp.  324-32,  349-50, 
389-91,  421-34.) 
The events  of these  months  have  the features of what under different 
circumstances  Friedman and Schwartz would  be willing  to describe as a 
monetary shock,  or indeed  as several shocks.  At other times widespread 
banking  failures  and  panic conditions  much  milder than those  of early 
1933 are considered  to be monetary  disturbances.  The gold outflow  and 
the increase in the discount  rate to defend  the gold standard despite  the 
depressed  level of real activity clearly represent unusual monetary devel- 
opments,  similar to those  of the  fall of  1931. And  the banking  holiday 
shares  with  the  episodes  emphasized  by  Friedman  and  Schwartz  the 
feature that it appears  to be a major contractionary step arising from an Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  129 
inadequate  understanding  of  the  workings  of  the  financial  system.  In 
sum,  it seems  extremely  plausible  that if the Depression  had continued 
to worsen  in 1933, Friedman and Schwartz would  have characterized the 
events  of January-March  1933 as a fifth "crucial experiment."4 
1941.  In September  1941 the Federal Reserve announced  a decision  to 
raise reserve  requirements  from 22.5 to 25% in November.  The increase 
was the same size as each of the last two steps of the three-step  increase 
in reserve requirements  in 1936-37.  This is important because  it is these 
last two  increases  that Friedman and Schwartz emphasize  in analyzing 
1937.  Furthermore,  as  Friedman  and  Schwartz  note  of  the  1937  in- 
creases,  the  open-market  operations  needed  to create a comparable re- 
duction in excess  reserves  would  have been extraordinarily large (1963a, 
pp. 531-32).  But they  attach little importance  to the 1941 increase.  They 
simply  state that: 
[banks] made no attempt to rebuild their excess reserves, as they had after the 
increases of 1936 and 1937,  but rather proceeded  to continue to reduce their 
remaining excess reserves. The effect of the reserve  requirement  increase  shows 
up only in a slackened  rate of rise of the deposit-reserve  ratio . . . (p. 556). 
The striking contrast between  Friedman and Schwartz's interpretations 
of the reserve  requirement  increases  of 1936-37  and 1941 suggests  that 
they commit the natural error of using the subsequent  behavior of money 
as a critical factor in identifying  monetary disturbances. This is inappropri- 
ate because  the  central reason  for employing  the narrative approach is 
that monetary  changes  may be partly endogenous.  If money  is in part 
governed  by output,  money  could have risen even after a contractionary 
monetary  shock,  because  non-monetary  factors were clearly expansion- 
ary in 1941. If the 1941 increase in reserve requirements had been followed 
by falls in the deposit-reserve  ratio and in money, it appears plausible that 
Friedman and Schwartz would  have described  the action as a monetary 
shock. Because the Federal Reserve remained unfamiliar with changes in 
4. It can be argued  that this negative  shock was  followed  by a positive  shock from Roose- 
velt's gold policies.  While changes  in competitiveness  arising from the rise in the dollar 
price of gold in 1933 could certainly have stimulated  the economy  through increased net 
exports,  Chandler  stresses  that Roosevelt's  gold  policies  "did not begin  to make addi- 
tions to the monetary  base or bank reserves  until after the adoption  of the Gold Reserve 
Act at the end  of January 1934" (1970, p.  164). Thus,  any monetary  component  to this 
positive  shock  did  not  occur until  nearly a year after the  negative  monetary  shock  of 
early 1933. Furthermore,  if one  follows  the logic of Friedman and Schwartz,  there may 
be no monetary  shock at all in 1934 because  an expansion  of high powered  money  is the 
usual and expected  reaction to severe  depression. 130 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
reserve  requirements,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  could  reasonably  have 
argued that the System again committed the error of causing a drastic shift 
in policy when  only a modest  one was intended.5 
2.2.2 The  Episodes  Included  by Friedman  and Schwartz.  A second argument 
that Friedman and Schwartz's  identification  of monetary  shocks may be 
biased focuses  on the episodes  they do select. If their selections  are unbi- 
ased, the effects of non-monetary  factors will not be systematically different 
following  the monetary  episodes  identified  from what  they are at other 
times.  If the  selections  are biased,  on  the  other  hand,  there  will  be  a 
tendency  for episodes  in which  other factors were acting to increase out- 
put to be excluded  from a list of negative  monetary disturbances and for 
episodes  in which other forces are acting to reduce output to be included. 
We argue that in all of the episodes  identified  by Friedman and Schwartz 
as involving  independent  negative  monetary  shocks  (with  the possible 
exception  of the period following  Britain's departure from gold in 1931), 
non-monetary  forces appear to have been  strongly contractionary. 
January-June 1920.  It is  not  difficult  to  find  candidate  nonmonetary 
explanations  of the decline  in output  from 1919 to 1921. With the end of 
World War I and the large-scale immediate  postwar relief efforts, govern- 
ment  spending  fell sharply. In addition,  it is often argued that the post- 
ponement  of purchases  of durable goods  during the war contributed to 
the  high  level  of  demand  in  1919 and  the  subsequent  fall in  1920-21 
(Gordon 1974, pp.  19-20,  for example).  Indeed,  Friedman and Schwartz 
agree  that non-monetary  forces  contributed  to the  downturn  and  may 
have made it inevitable  (1963a, p. 237). 
Two comparisons  suggest  that non-monetary  forces were important in 
1920-21.  The first comparison  is with other countries.  Declining  output 
was  not  unique  to  the  United  States.  In  1919-21,  there  were  falls  in 
5. A final episode  that is not identified  in the Monetary History as a major shock,  but that 
could  be  considered  a change  in  monetary  policy,  is  the  contractionary  open  market 
operations  and increases  in the discount  rate that began in January 1928 (see,  for exam- 
ple,  Hamilton  1987; Schwartz  1981; and  Temin 1988). While we  agree  that money  be- 
came tighter in this period,  it is not clear whether  this tightening  should  be viewed  as 
unusual  or simply  as a usual  reaction to real economic  events  such as the boom in real 
output  and stock prices.  Furthermore,  we  also agree with Friedman and Schwartz that 
the tightening  in 1928 was  fairly small,  especially  when  considered  relative to the con- 
tractionary shocks in 1920, 1931, and 1937. As they note,  the Federal Reserve "followed a 
policy  which  was  too  easy  to  break  the  speculative  boom,  yet  too  tight  to  promote 
healthy  economic  growth"  (1963,  p.  291).  (Gordon  and  Wilcox,  1981, and  Hamilton, 
1987, also provide  evidence  that the monetary shock in 1928-29 was small relative to the 
subsequent  decline  in real output.)  Hence,  unless  one  uses  a procedure  that calibrates 
shocks  according  to  severity,  it  is  prudent  not  to  identify  the  1928 tightening  as  a 
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output  much  larger than  that in the  United  States in the United  King- 
dom,  Italy,  Norway,  and  Canada  (Maddison  1982,  Table  A7).  The 
breadth  of  the  downturn  suggests  that the  contractionary  forces were 
broader  than  the  idiosyncracies  of  U.S.  monetary  policy.  The  second 
comparison  is with  the  aftermath  of World War II. From 1918 to 1921, 
government  purchases  as a fraction of GNP fell by 13 percentage points; 
real GNP rose  1.1% from 1918 to 1919 and then  fell 3.5% between  1919 
and  1921.6 From  1944 to  1947,  the  share  of  government  purchases  in 
GNP fell by 35 percentage  points; real GNP fell by 25.8%. That is, the fall 
in total output relative to the fall in government  purchases was consider- 
ably larger after World War II than after World War I.7 This comparison 
suggests  that in isolation,  the decline  in government  spending  between 
1919 and 1921 may have been  depressing  the economy  greatly. 
October  1931.  We view the Federal Reserve's response  to Britain's depar- 
ture from gold as perhaps  Friedman and Schwartz's clearest example of 
a monetary  disturbance  not obviously  complicated  by strongly contrac- 
tionary non-monetary  forces. Nonetheless,  two non-monetary  forces do 
appear  to have  been  acting  to reduce  output  after October 1931. First, 
fiscal policy  turned contractionary, though  less  sharply than in 1918-20. 
The  enactment  of  a  massive  tax  increase  in  1932  reduced  E.  Cary 
Brown's  measure  of the  full employment  deficit  from 3.6% of GNP in 
1931 to 1.8% in 1932 and then  to 0.5% in 1933 (Brown 1956, Table 1, col. 
14). Second,  it was  during  the period  1930-32  that the erection of mas- 
sive tariff barriers and the consequent  collapse of world trade reached its 
height,  a development  often  thought  to be central to the deepening  of 
the Depression  (Kindleberger 1986, pp.  123-26). 
June 1936-January 1937.  Two non-monetary  forces  were  acting  to  de- 
crease  output  in  1937.  The  first was  fiscal  policy.  From  1936 to  1937 
Brown's  measure  of the full employment  deficit moved  toward surplus 
by 2.4% of GNP, reflecting  the end  of the 1936 veterans' bonus  and the 
first widespread  collection  of  social  security  payroll taxes.  The second 
was  labor market  developments.  The enactment  of the Wagner Act in 
1935 led, in a common  interpretation,  to large inventory  accumulation in 
anticipation  of labor market strife and  wage  increases; both  the end  of 
the inventory  accumulation  and the appearance of the anticipated strikes 
and  wage  increases  then  contributed  to  the  downturn  in  1937 (Kin- 
6. Throughout  the paper, percentage  changes refer  to differences  in logarithms. 
7. For 1918-21,  the  GNP  data are from Romer (1988a, Table 5) and the government  pur- 
chases  data are from Kendrick  (1961, Table A-IIa). The data for 1944-47  are from the 
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dieberger,  pp.  270-71).  Over  half of the  fall in real GNP  from 1936 to 
1937 took the form of a sharp reversal of inventory  investment. 
In addition,  it is essential  to Friedman and Schwartz's interpretation of 
economic  developments  in  this  period  that banks  strongly  desired  to 
hold  large  excess  reserves  and  that  they  therefore  responded  to  the 
increase  in reserve  requirements  by  moving  to restore  their excess  re- 
serves.  But the behavior  of reserve  holdings  appears  strikingly counter 
to this interpretation: there was no discernible change in the behavior of 
reserves  as  a  fraction  of  deposits  until  December  1937,  seventeen 
months  after the first increase  in reserve requirements  was announced. 
By  this  time  the  declines  in  money  and  industrial  production  were 
largely complete.8 
The  early stages of the Great  Depression.  The issue of whether monetary or 
non-monetary  forces were primarily responsible  for the initial two years 
or so  of the  collapse  of economic  activity  that began  in  1929 has  been 
sufficiently  debated  that there is no need  for us to argue that the case in 
favor of a monetary  interpretation  is not clear cut. As in the other epi- 
sodes  we  have  discussed,  non-monetary  forces were  strongly  contrac- 
tionary during  this period  (see Temin 1976, and Romer 1988b). Indeed, 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  do  not  argue  that  monetary  policy  (or some 
other aspect  of monetary  developments)  was  unusually  contractionary 
from the stock market crash in October 1929 through the spring of 1930, 
a period that saw industrial production  fall by 13%. Moreover, from the 
spring  through  October  1930, when  industrial  production  fell an addi- 
tional  16%, according  to  Friedman  and  Schwartz  monetary  develop- 
ments  were  unusual  in at most  a passive  sense-monetary  authorities 
failed to intervene  in the way they normally would  have in such a crisis. 
This view  appears to imply that although  monetary forces played a role, 
the initiating shocks  during this period were not monetary. And indeed, 
as has been extensively  discussed,  the behavior of interest rates appears 
more  consistent  with  the  non-monetary  than  the monetary  interpreta- 
tion of the initial downturn  (Temin 1976; Hamilton 1987). In addition,  by 
late  1930 there  were  additional  non-monetary  forces  at work: the  col- 
lapse  of world  trade  (discussed  above)  and  possible  non-monetary  ef- 
fects of bankruptcies  and bank failures (Bernanke 1983). 
8. As an accounting  matter, the swing  from rapid growth  of the money  stock from 1934 to 
1937 to a decline  in 1937-38  was  primarily the  result of a sharp decline  in the growth 
rate of  high-powered  money.  This  in  turn  appears  to  have  stemmed  largely  from  a 
switch  by  the  Treasury to  sterilizing  gold  inflows  in  the  first three  quarters of  1937. 
Friedman and  Schwartz  do  not  discuss  the  reasons  for this change  in Treasury policy 
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
This discussion  of possible  bias in Friedman and Schwartz's  identifica- 
tion of shocks is not meant  to imply that the evidence  from the interwar 
era is unsupportive  of the view  that monetary  disturbances have impor- 
tant  real consequences.  It does,  however,  suggest  that  their evidence 
may not  be as decisive  as it once  seemed.  The fact that Friedman and 
Schwartz exclude  some  apparent negative  shocks that were followed  by 
improvements  in economic  performance,  and the fact that the effects of 
the monetary  shocks  they identify  appear to have been compounded  by 
adverse  non-monetary  factors,  both  imply  that  monetary  shocks  by 
themselves  may be less potent  than Friedman and Schwartz argued. 
Our analysis  of Friedman and Schwartz's identification  of shocks also 
suggests  an important  lesson  about  using  the narrative approach.  The 
main  reason  there  is  room  for  unconscious  bias  in  Friedman  and 
Schwartz's  identification  of shocks  is that they  use  a very broad defini- 
tion  of  what  constitutes  a  shock:  a  shock  occurs  whenever  monetary 
policy  is "unusual"  given  the  state of the real economy.  Friedman and 
Schwartz  are forced  to  adopt  this  definition  because  there  is  so  much 
variation in monetary  institutions,  in the theoretical framework adhered 
to  by  central  bankers,  and  in  the  particulars  of  important  monetary 
episodes  in the interwar era. Because of this variation, it is impossible  to 
lay out a clear and  workable  set of criteria that can be used  to identify 
monetary  shocks  throughout  the  interwar period.  Therefore,  a natural 
way  to  attempt  to  improve  on  what  Friedman  and  Schwartz  do  is  to 
apply the narrative approach to an era where a more precise definition of 
a shock can be specified. 
3. Friedman  and  Schwartz  Extended 
As a laboratory for a test of the real effects of monetary disturbances,  the 
postwar  era stands  in admirable contrast to the interwar years.  At least 
in comparison  to the interwar era, the Federal Reserve in the postwar era 
has had a reasonably  stable view  of the functioning  of the economy  and 
of the  role of monetary  policy.  As  a result,  there have  been  important 
similarities across major monetary  episodes.  Thus,  while  judgment  still 
plays a role in the identification  of shocks,  as it must do when  identifica- 
tion is based on the historical record, its role can be much smaller than in 
the earlier period.  In addition,  for the postwar period there are extensive 
contemporary  records  of  the  nature  and  motives  of  Federal  Reserve 
policy. This is useful because  reliance on contemporaneous  judgments  of 
the  sources  and  intents  of shifts  in policy  again  reduces  the  scope  for 
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In  this  section  we  therefore  use  the  narrative  approach  to  study 
whether  monetary  policy  shocks  in the postwar  era have had important 
real effects.  The section  is divided  into two  parts. Section 3.1 discusses 
our procedures  for identifying  monetary  shocks  in the postwar  era and 
sketches  the evidence  underlying  our choices  of monetary  shocks.  Sec- 
tion  3.2  presents  evidence  on  whether  these  monetary  shocks  affect 
output.  It  includes  both  informal  evidence  and  a  statistical  test  of 
whether  the monetary  disturbances  we identify are followed  by unusual 
movements  in real output. 
3.1 THE  IDENTIFICATION  OF MONETARY  SHOCKS 
3.1.1 Definition.  Like Friedman and Schwartz, we use the historical rec- 
ord to identify  monetary  shocks.  We employ, however,  a much narrower 
definition  of what constitutes  a shock.  In particular, we count as a shock 
only episodes  in which  the Federal Reserve attempted  to exert a contrac- 
tionary influence  on the economy  in order to reduce inflation. That is, we 
focus  on  times  when  the  Federal Reserve  attempted  not  to offset  per- 
ceived or prospective  increases in aggregate demand but to actively shift 
the aggregate  demand  curve back in response  to what it perceived  to be 
"excessive" inflation.  Or, to put it another way, we look for times when 
concern  about  the  current level  of inflation  led  the Federal Reserve  to 
attempt to induce  a recession  (or at least a "growth recession"). 
This definition  of a monetary  shock is clearly very limited.  It excludes 
both  monetary  contractions  that are generated  by concerns  other than 
inflation and all monetary expansions.  This single-minded  focus on nega- 
tive shocks  to counteract  inflation  has  two  crucial advantages.  Its most 
obvious  advantage  is  that  it  defines  a  shock  in  narrow  and  concrete 
terms. Rather than looking  for times when  monetary policy was unusual 
given  everything  else  that was  going  on in the economy,  as Friedman 
and  Schwartz  do,  we  look  only  for  times  when  the  Federal  Reserve 
specifically intended  to use the tools it had available to attempt to create 
a recession  to cure inflation.  This precise definition greatly limits the role 
of judgment  in identifying  monetary  shocks. 
The second  reason  for our limited  focus is that we believe  that policy 
decisions  to attempt to cure inflation come as close as practically possible 
to being  independent  of factors that affect real output.  In other words, 
we  do  not  believe  that the  Federal Reserve  states  an intent  to cause  a 
recession  to lower  inflation  only at times when  a recession  would  occur 
in any event.  This belief rests partly on an assumption  that trend infla- 
tion by itself  does  not  affect the  dynamics  of real output.  We find this 
assumption  reasonable:  there appears  to be no plausible  channel  other 
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output swings.  By contrast, other factors that are important to the forma- 
tion of monetary  policy are likely to affect real activity directly. For exam- 
ple,  because  shifts  to expansionary  monetary  policy in the postwar  era 
almost  always  stem  from a desire  to halt declines  in real output,  these 
policy changes  are obviously  far from independent  of factors that affect 
the path of output.  As a result,  it would  be difficult to distinguish  any 
real effects of expansionary  shifts from whatever natural recovery mecha- 
nism  the economy  may have.  It is for exactly this reason that we  focus 
only on negative  shocks. 
Our belief  that anti-inflationary  shifts in policy  are not simply  occur- 
ring whenever  a recession  is about to occur also rests on a belief that the 
Federal Reserve is not always in fact reacting to some other factor-such 
as  a  large  adverse  supply  shock  or  a  temporary  output  boom-that 
might by itself lead to a recession.  As our descriptions  of the specifics of 
the episodes  that we  consider  will show,  this does  not appear to be the 
case.  Indeed,  as we  describe,  the inflation to which  the Federal Reserve 
responds  often appears to be largely the result of past shocks rather than 
of current real developments.  Furthermore, in our statistical work below 
we  attempt  to  test  both  for the  possibility  that anti-inflationary  policy 
shifts are correlated with other factors that potentially  affect real output 
and for the possibility  that inflation directly affects real output.  We find 
no evidence  of either of these  effects. 
To actually  discern  the intentions  of the Federal Reserve,  we  rely en- 
tirely on contemporary  Federal Reserve  records-the  "Record of Policy 
Actions" of the Board of Governors  and the Federal Open Market Com- 
mittee  (FOMC) and,  until  their discontinuance  in 1976, the minutes  of 
FOMC meetings.  To identify a shock from these sources we look both for 
a clear statement  of a belief  that the current level  of inflation needed  to 
be  lowered  and  some  indication  that  output  consequences  would  be 
sought,  or at least tolerated,  to bring the reduction about. In this process 
we  only  consider  contemporaneous  (or nearly contemporaneous)  state- 
ments  of the Federal Reserve's  intent.  We do not consider retrospective 
discussions  of  intent  because  such  descriptions  could  be  biased  by  a 
knowledge  of the subsequent  behavior of real activity. 
3.1.2  Results.  On the basis  of Federal Reserve  records,  we  identify  six 
times since World War II when  the Federal Reserve moved  to attempt to 
induce a recession  to reduce inflation. They are October 1947, September 
1955, December  1968,  April  1974,  August  1978, and  October  1979. In 
each case,  the Federal Reserve  appears  to have  made  a deliberate deci- 
sion to sacrifice real output  to lower inflation.  In this section we describe 
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the objectives  of monetary  policy during these  episodes.  In addition,  to 
provide  further information  about our selection  procedure,  we  describe 
two  episodes  that we  do  not  classify  as independent  monetary  distur- 
bances.  One occurred in 1966 when  the System shifted to a tighter policy 
out of a desire to prevent  increases  in aggregate demand  rather than out 
of a desire  to contract demand.  The other occurred over  the extended 
period  1975-78  when  the  Federal Reserve  expressed  considerable  con- 
cern  about  inflation  but  did  not  appear  to  be  willing  to  sacrifice real 
output  to reduce it. 
October  1947.  With the end  of World War II, inflation became  the Fed- 
eral Reserve's  central concern.  Two factors, however,  stopped  the Fed- 
eral Reserve from shifting  to a significantly  tighter policy in the first few 
years after the war. The first was  the wartime policy of pegging  interest 
rates on both short-term and long-term government  bonds.  By June 1946 
there  was  considerable  sentiment  on  the  FOMC in  favor  of  pursuing 
policies that would  cause short-term interest rates to rise (Minutes, 1946, 
pp.  55-56,  for  example).  But obtaining  a  consensus  in  favor  of  such 
policies  and  then  reaching  an  agreement  with  the  Treasury to  permit 
short-term rates to increase was a lengthy  process; the pegging  of short- 
term interest rates did not end until July 1947. Second,  although inflation 
was  the  primary concern,  there  was  also  fear that the  end  of the  war 
would  lead to another depression. 
In October  1947,  with  short-term  interest  rates no  longer  fixed  and 
fears of depression  allayed, the Federal Reserve began a series of contrac- 
tionary  measures.  These  actions  included  open-market  operations  de- 
signed  to increase  short-term  interest  rates, an increase in the discount 
rate, and an increase in reserve requirements for banks in central reserve 
cities.  The motive  behind  these  measures  was  a desire  to reduce infla- 
tion. At the June 1947 FOMC meeting, 
it was [the] opinion [of the chief  Federal  Reserve  economist  present]  that through- 
out the war and postwar period there  had been too many fears of postwar  defla- 
tion, with the result that actions which should have been taken to counteract 
inflation  were not taken, because  of the  fear that they would result in contraction, 
and that, although  any downturn should be taken  care  of at the proper  time, the 
important  thing at the moment  was to stop abnormal  pressures  on the inflation- 
ary side. (Minutes, 1947, p.  111.) 
He  held  this  view  even  though  he  believed  that economic  conditions 
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were summarized  succinctly:  "He thought  that there would  and should 
be  a mild  recession"  (Minutes, 1947, p.112).  In sum,  beginning  in late 
1947 the  Federal  Reserve  was  actively  attempting  to reduce  aggregate 
demand  in order to reduce inflation. 
September  1955.  Beginning  roughly  in June  1954,  in  response  to  evi- 
dence  of the  end  of the  1953-54  recession,  the Federal Reserve  ceased 
pursuing  what  is  perceived  to  be  an  active  expansionary  policy.  This 
change,  of  course,  does  not  represent  a monetary  shock.  The Federal 
Reserve was  not attempting  to reduce aggregate  demand; rather, it sim- 
ply believed  that an active stimulus  was no longer needed  for output  to 
grow. 
Beginning  in  early  1955 considerable  concern  was  expressed  by  the 
Federal Reserve  about  inflation.9 This  concern  does  not  seem  to have 
had an important effect on policy during the first part of the year. But in 
approximately  September  1955 the  character of policy  appears  to have 
changed.  The Federal Reserve  actively began  to attempt to contract ag- 
gregate demand  even  though  members of the FOMC did not believe that 
output  growth,  or expected  future  output  growth,  was  stronger  than 
before. At the FOMC meeting  of September  14, for example,  despite  the 
fact that "review  of the available data suggested  that the economy  had 
entered  a phase  of decelerating  advance,  .  .  . it was  the  judgment  of the 
Committee  that [the] situation called at least for the maintenance  of, and 
preferably some  slight  increase  in,  the restraining pressure  it had been 
exerting  through  open  market operations."  The reason  was  that "price 
advances  were  occurring  in  considerable  numbers,  with  further wide- 
spread  increases  in  prospect"  (both  quotations  are from  1955 Annual 
Report, p.  105). In October they  suggested  that a mild downturn  might 
not  be undesirable:  "the Committee  concluded  the  situation  called for 
continuing  the  present  policy  of restraint" despite  the fact that a "ten- 
dency  toward  a  downturn  in  the  economy  ...  might  develop"(1955 
Annual Report, p.  106). In November  the  Committee  wished  to  dispel 
"any idea of  an  easing  of  System  policy"  (1955 Annual Report, p.  108; 
emphasis  added). 
The Federal Reserve's  conduct in the first part of 1956 lends additional 
support to the view  that System policy shifted in the fall of 1955. During 
this period the FOMC felt that no change  in policy was called for in the 
face of evidence  of essentially  zero  output  growth.  This indicates  that 
9. See,  for example,  the  FOMC meetings  of January 11, June 22, and July 12, 1955 (1955 
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expansion  at  less  than  trend  rates  was  what  they  were  seeking.?1 In 
March the Committee  explicitly took the view  that it should  "combat an 
inflationary  cost-price  spiral" despite  "the risk of incurring  temporary 
unemployment"  (1956 Annual Report, p. 26). We conclude  that the Fed- 
eral Reserve  shifted  to a policy  of actively  attempting  to reduce  aggre- 
gate demand  to combat inflation in late 1955. 
1966.  Despite  its fame, the "credit crunch" of 1966 does not represent a 
monetary  shock by our criteria. The reason is that the Federal Reserve's 
stated intent  was  clearly not to reduce aggregate  demand,  but rather to 
prevent outward shifts in aggregate demand that it believed would other- 
wise  have  occurred.  In December  1965, for example,  the System  raised 
the discount  rate and acted to increase other interest rates in response  to 
evidence  that "economic activity was increasing vigorously  and that the 
outlook appeared  more expansive  than previously," not out of a desire to 
induce  a contraction  (1965 Annual Report, p.  150). The perception  of the 
economy's  strength  was  based  not  just  on  current  data  but  also  on 
projections  of  growing  military  expenditures  because  of  the  Vietnam 
War and  survey  evidence  that consumers  and  firms were  planning  to 
increase  their  spending.  The Federal Reserve  stated  explicitly  that the 
purpose  of  the  shift  in  policy  "was  not  to  cut back the  pace  of credit 
flows but to dampen  mounting  demands  on banks for still further credit 
extensions"  (1965 Annual Report, p. 64). 
The  same  pattern  continued  through  August  1966. In February, the 
Committee's  perception  was  that  "business  activity  continued  to  ad- 
vance  vigorously-and  the  outlook  was  becoming  increasingly  ex- 
pansive,"  and  that  "recent  and  prospective  economic  developments 
clearly called  for added  policy  measures  to  dampen  the  rise in aggre- 
gate  demands"  (1966  Annual  Report, pp.  127,  129).  In  August,  "the 
economic  outlook  remained  expansive,  and  prospects  were  for  con- 
tinuing  high  levels  of  resource  use  and  strong  upward  pressures  on 
wages  and  prices."  Military, investment,  and  consumption  spending 
were  all viewed  as  contributing  to the  expansion  (1966 Annual Report, 
p. 171). 
Thus the Federal Reserve's  shift to a tighter monetary policy in 1965- 
66 does not belong  on a list of episodes  in which the Federal Reserve was 
actively attempting  to induce  a downturn.  By our criteria, it would be no 
more appropriate  to include  this episode  than to include,  for example, 
10. See,  for example,  the Record of Policy Actions  for the FOMC meetings  of January 10, 
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the  shift  to  a tighter  policy  in  1950  to  counteract  the  expansion  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  expected  because  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  War." 
December 1968.  From  mid-1967  to  late  1968,  the  Federal  Reserve  gradu- 
ally  tried  to  adopt  tighter  policies  as  it  became  clear  that  the  "mini- 
recession"  of  1966-67  would  not  turn  into  a full-fledged  downturn  and 
as  growth  became  stronger.  As  before,  such  a  shift  in  the  specifics  of 
monetary  policy  in  response  to  economic  developments  does  not  repre- 
sent  a monetary  shock.  But  at roughly  the  end  of  1968  there  appears  to 
have  been  a change  in  the  goals  of  policy:  the  Federal  Reserve  began  to 
feel  that  it should  act  to reduce  inflation.  There  were  frequent  references 
to  "the  prevailing  inflationary  psychology,"  to  the  fact  that  "inflationary 
expectations  remained  widespread,"  to "expectations  of continuing  infla- 
tion,"  and  so  on.12 
Concern  about  inflation  caused  the  Federal  Reserve  to attempt  to main- 
tain  tight  monetary  policy  despite  evidence  of  considerably  weaker  real 
growth.  In  March  1969,  for  example,  despite  reductions  in  present  and 
11. On the basis of the Record of Policy Actions,  one could argue for a similar interpreta- 
tion of the shift to tighter policy in October of 1947. The record for the FOMC meeting 
of  October  6-7  states:  "In the  period  since  the  previous  meeting  of  the  Committee 
conditions  affecting  the  money  market had  changed  considerably.  Inflationary pres- 
sures had increased  and there were  indications  that they would  continue  to be strong 
in the months  immediately  ahead" (1947 Annual Report, p. 95). The interpretation that 
the Federal Reserve was attempting  to do more than offset shocks to aggregate demand 
appears  more compelling,  however,  for two reasons.  First, it is very plausible that the 
minutes  could  be  much  franker than  the  Record  of  Policy  Actions  concerning  any 
desire  to cause a recession.  Second,  inspection  of the reasons  that the Federal Reserve 
gave  in support  of the view  that inflationary pressures  were  increasing  strongly  sug- 
gests  that what  they  meant  was  simply  that in the absence  of tighter policy, inflation 
and high  output  would  continue.  For example: 
Inflationary  pressures  have been  strong in our economy  during the past  few months, and there  is 
ample indication that these pressures will continue strong, and perhaps  be accentuated,  in the 
months immediately  ahead. The basic causes of this situation are well known. A vast supply of 
money and other liquid assets was created  during the war and there  have been  additions to this 
accumulation  of purchasing power since the end of the war. There  has also been an inadequate 
supply of goods and services . . . growing out of the destruction  of war and the deferment  of 
civilian demands when a large part of output was destined  for military use  ....  The existing 
situation, therefore,  spells continuing pressure toward  higher prices. In addition we must take 
cognizance  of the  fact that conditions  are highly favorable  to further  credit  expansion. .. .  (From 
a letter  from the FOMC to the Secretary  of the Treasury;  Minutes 1947, pp.  183-84). 
Aside  from  the  phrase  "and perhaps  be  accentuated,"  what  was  being  argued  was 
simply  that, in the absence  of tighter policy, prices, credit, and money  would  continue 
to increase. 
12. The  quotations  are  from  the  Records  of  Policy  Actions  of  the  FOMC meetings  of 
December  17, 1968, January 14, 1969, and  March 4,  1969-1968  Annual Report, p.  224, 
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projected  growth,  "the  Committee  agreed  that,  in  light  of  the  persis- 
tence  of inflationary  pressures  and expectations,  the existing  degree  of 
monetary restraint should  be continued  at present" (1969 Annual Report, 
p. 121). In May, "The Committee  took note of the signs of some  slowing 
in the economic  expansion  and of the indications  of stringency  in finan- 
cial markets.  In view  of the persistence  of strong inflationary pressures 
and expectations,  however,  the members  agreed that a relaxation of the 
existing  degree  of monetary  restraint would  not be appropriate at this 
time" (1969 Annual Report, p.  145). In October, faced with projections of 
essentially  no real growth over the coming  three quarters, "the Commit- 
tee decided that a relaxation of monetary restraint would not be appropri- 
ate at this  time in light  of the persistence  of inflationary pressures  and 
expectations"  (1969 Annual Report,  pp. 185-86).  The considerations  guid- 
ing monetary policy were similar at most other meetings  during the year, 
and inflation  and inflationary  expectations  received  great attention  and 
concern  throughout.  The  intent  to  do  more  than  offset  expected  in- 
creases in aggregate  demand  is clear.13 
April 1974.  The  Federal  Reserve  responded  to  the  oil  embargo  that 
started in  October  1973 with  an attempt  to loosen  policy  somewhat  to 
mitigate the contractionary influences  and uncertainty generated  by the 
embargo.  With the lifting of the embargo in March 1974 and the end  of 
wage  and price controls  in April,  the Federal Reserve was  faced with  a 
rate of  inflation  even  higher  than  one  that  it had  already  considered 
excessive  in the fall of 1973. It responded  with an active effort at contrac- 
tion.  Throughout  the  spring  and  early  summer,  whenever  there  was 
conflict between  the System's  short-run interest rate and money  targets, 
the FOMC, in contrast to its practice in earlier years, resolved  the doubts 
in whichever  way  produced  the higher interest rate. Indeed,  on several 
occasions  the  Committee  pursued  (or accepted)  higher  interest  rates 
despite  the fact that monetary  growth was within its target range.'4 This 
occurred in an environment  where  little or no  real growth  was  taking 
place or was  expected  in the near future. The motive for the attempts at 
contraction  was  inflation.  There were  references  to "the persistence  of 
inflation  and  of  inflationary  psychology"  and  "the need  for policy  ac- 
13. One  can  plausibly  argue  that  the  shock  could  be  dated  a month  or two  later than 
December  1968. The tightening  that occurred in December  was  in part a response  to 
evidence  of stronger  growth.  By early 1969, however,  it was  clear that the change  in 
policy involved  more. We choose  December  1968 because the Federal Reserve cites this 
as  the  time  when  "the  Federal  Reserve  System  embarked  on  a policy  of  increased 
monetary restraint" (1969 Annual Report, p. 75). Dating the shock in March 1969 has no 
important effect on our results. 
14. See especially  1974 Annual Report, pp.  165, 173, 180-81. Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  141 
tions to counter inflationary expectations."  In one typical discussion,  the 
central  considerations  were  described  as  "the  rise  in  market  interest 
rates,  the  strong  performance  of the  monetary  aggregates,  and-more 
broadly-the  rapid advances  in prices and costs."15 
1975-78.  At the end of the 1973-75  recession  in early 1975, the Federal 
Reserve  faced  a rate of inflation  that was  high  by historical standards. 
Over the next few years, inflation was a constant concern of the System. 
The level  of  inflation  was  often  cited  as a reason  for tight policy,  and 
policy was  frequently  described  as "anti-inflationary" or as based on an 
underlying  objective  of a gradual return to stable prices.  Thus one  can 
argue  that  the  Federal  Reserve  was  attempting  to  shift  the  aggregate 
demand  curve back throughout  this period. 
In our judgment,  however,  this interpretation of Federal Reserve objec- 
tives would  be incorrect. Given the level of inflation,  expressions  of con- 
cern about inflation,  and of desires  to reduce inflation,  were  inevitable. 
But the  actual  commitment  to  combat  inflation  appears  to  have  been 
weak.  It was not until April 1976 that "it was observed that this might be 
an  opportune  time  for the  Committee  to  take a small  step  toward  its 
longer-range  objective  of returning  growth  in the monetary  aggregates 
toward rates consistent  with general price stability" (1976 Annual Report, 
p. 203). Target annual monetary growth rates, which were not the central 
focus of policy, were lowered  only one or two percentage points over the 
next two years, and little other explicit anti-inflationary action was taken. 
More important,  the few  comments  that relate to the output  or employ- 
ment goals of policy reveal that the Federal Reserve was not attempting to 
cause discernible  output  sacrifices to reduce inflation.  In February 1978, 
one FOMC member  expressed  the view  that "a realistic objective for the 
unemployment  rate now  was  considerably  higher  than  it used  to be, 
perhaps  as high  as 5.5 to 6 per cent" (1978 Annual Report, p.  132). This 
suggests  that previously  policy had been aiming at an even lower rate. In 
May of that year, when  the unemployment  rate was 6%, "a few members 
observed that  ...  it would be desirable for growth in real output to dimin- 
ish in the second half of this year toward a rate that could be sustained  for 
the longer term," again implying  that the Federal Reserve had previously 
been  aiming  for growth  above  trend rates (1978 Annual Report, p.  176). 
August 1978.  After several  years of expressing  concern about inflation 
but  taking  little  concrete  action  to  combat  it,  Federal  Reserve  policy 
15. 1974 Annual Report, pp.  109, 108, and 108, respectively. The statments occur in explana- 
tions  of decisions  by  the  Board of Governors  to deny  proposed  increases  in the  dis- 
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changed  significantly  in 1978. In August,  the FOMC recognized  the "pos- 
sibility that an appreciable slowing  of inflation would prove more difficult 
to achieve  than previously  had been anticipated" (1978 Annual Report,  p. 
210). Steps to tighten  policy began in August,  and in November  the gov- 
ernment announced  a major program to strengthen  the weak dollar and 
combat inflation.  The discount  rate was raised from 7.25 to 9.5% in four 
steps from August  to November  1978, and reserve requirements were also 
increased in November.  By November  the System was fairly explicit that 
its objective was to cause a growth recession.  The tightening of policy was 
continued  despite  forecasts of sluggish  growth,  and despite  the fact that 
"skepticism  was  expressed  [by  some  members  of  the  FOMC]  .  .  .  that 
growth in output could be tapered down  to a relatively slow rate without 
bringing on a recession"  (1978 Annual Report, p. 247). 
The  tightening  of  policy  continued  in  1979.  The  discount  rate was 
raised another  1.5 percentage  points  in three steps from July to Septem- 
ber. During this period almost all questions  about the conduct  of mone- 
tary policy were  resolved  on the side of tightness.  When money  growth 
was  high  the  System  acted  to raise interest  rates and  dampen  growth; 
when  money  growth  was  low  no  actions  were  taken  to lower  interest 
rates and  spur  growth.  All of this  occurred against  a background  of a 
deteriorating forecast for short-run real growth  (including a belief in the 
summer of 1979 that a recession  was under way),  which would  typically 
have  led  to  efforts  to  stimulate  the  economy.  This  clearly indicates  a 
desire to contract the economy  rather than just hold it steady. 
October  1979.  There was another major anti-inflationary shock to mone- 
tary policy on October 6, 1979. In effect, the Federal Reserve decided that 
its measures  over the previous  year had been  unsuccessful  in reducing 
inflation and that much  stronger  measures  were  needed.  Although  the 
shift in policy  was  to some  extent  presented  as a technical change,  the 
fact that it was intended  to lead to considerably  higher interest rates and 
lower  money  growth  was  clear. For example,  "the Committee  antici- 
pated  that  the  shift  .  .  . would  result  in  ...  a prompt  increase  ...  in the 
federal funds  rate" (1979 Annual Report, p.  204). The upper  end  of the 
short-run  target  range  for  the  federal  funds  rate  was  raised  by  3.75 
percentage  points,  while  the  lower  end  was  essentially  unchanged.  It 
was also clear that a central underlying  objective of the change in policy 
was a reduction  in inflation.  For example: "the purpose  of this series of 
actions [taken on October 6] was to assure better control over the expan- 
sion of money  and bank credit and to help  curb speculative  excesses  in 
financial,  foreign  exchange,  and commodity  markets,  thereby dampen- 
ing inflationary forces in the economy"  (1979 Annual Report,  p. 109). Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  143 
Intents versus Actions.  Our definition  of a shock and our discussion  of 
particular episodes  makes it clear that our central concern has been with 
the intentions  rather than the actions of the Federal Reserve. We do this 
because the same actions can occur both independent  of the real economy 
and in response  to real events.  For example,  the monetary base could fall 
because the Federal Reserve wished  to cause a recession or because it was 
attempting  to  dampen  an  expansion  that it believed  would  otherwise 
have occurred.  Thus,  only a narrative analysis  of intentions  can identify 
changes  in policy  that are independent  of the real economy. 
At the same time, however,  intentions  not backed up by actions would 
not be  expected  to  have  large real effects.  It is for this reason  that we 
only  consider  as  shocks  episodes  when  the Federal Reserve  genuinely 
appeared  willing  to accept output  losses.  We feel that it is only in these 
instances  that the Federal Reserve is likely to actually use the tools it has 
available to contract the economy.  In this regard, it is useful  to note that 
while  actions  were  not  explicitly  considered  in  our  identification  of 
shocks,  financial  market  conditions  did  change  greatly  in  each  of  the 
episodes  in which  we  identify  a shock.  In particular, interest rates rose 
sharply.  For example,  from  three  months  before  our  shocks  to  three 
months  after, the six-month  commerical paper rate rose by an average of 
29%. The smallest  increase  was  16% (for the 1968 shock) and the largest 
40% (for the 1955 shock).  Thus,  the Federal Reserve's intentions  appear 
to have been  supported  by actions.16 
3.2 DOES  REAL  ACTIVITY  RESPOND  TO MONETARY  SHOCKS? 
Having  identified  this  sequence  of  six postwar  episodes  in which  the 
Federal Reserve appears to have deliberately tried to cause a recession  to 
reduce inflation,  the natural question  to ask is whether  recessions  in fact 
followed  these  disturbances.  In this  section,  we  provide  both  informal 
evidence  and a statistical test of the relationship  between  our monetary 
shocks and the subsequent  behavior of industrial production and unem- 
ployment  in the post-World War II period. 
3.2.1  Informal Evidence.  We first examine  the  behavior  of  output  and 
unemployment  after each of the postwar shocks we have identified.  The 
16. Using  the federal funds  rate for the five episodes  that have occurred since the develop- 
ment  of the  federal  funds  market does  not alter these  results.  The growth  rate of the 
monetary  base also generally  slows  around  the times of the shocks,  though  its move- 
ments  across episodes  are less consistent  than those of the commerical paper rate. The 
reason for this greater variability is very likely simply that in all of the episodes  (includ- 
ing the 1979 one)  the Federal Reserve focused  to a considerable  extent on interest rate 
movements,  while  in  many  of  the  episodes  it was  relatively  unconcerned  with  the 
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data used  in  this  analysis  are the  monthly  total industrial  production 
series  compiled  by  the  Federal Reserve  Board and  the  monthly  unem- 
ployment  rate of all civilian  workers  compiled  by the  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.17  In both  cases  we  use  the  seasonally  unadjusted  version  of 
the series  and  then  account  for seasonal  movements  by regressing  the 
series on a set of seasonal  dummy  variables. 
Figure 1 shows  the resulting  seasonally  adjusted industrial production 
(in logarithms)  and unemployment  rate series.  We have  drawn vertical 
lines in the six months  of the postwar era in which we identify monetary 
shocks.  From  these  graphs  it  appears  that  real economic  activity  de- 
creases  substantially  after each of our monetary  shocks.  The results are 
particularly  striking  for the  unemployment  series:  the  unemployment 
rate rises  sharply  after each shock.  Industrial production  also falls sub- 
stantially  after  each  shock,  although  these  movements  are somewhat 
obscured  by  the  high  monthly  variation  in  the  series  and  the  strong 
upward trend. Another  striking characteristic of Figure 1 is that there are 
only two major decreases  in real activity that are not preceded  by mone- 
tary shocks.  Again,  this feature is most  apparent in the unemployment 
series.  The two  significant  rises in unemployment  that are not preceded 
by a monetary  shock occur in 1954 (at the end of the Korean War) and in 
1961. 
While  these  graphs  are suggestive,  simple  plots  of  the  data cannot 
distinguish  between  movements  in  real  activity  caused  by  monetary 
shocks  and  movements  that occur because  the economy  may naturally 
tend to cycle up and down.  To abstract from the typical cyclical behavior 
of real activity, we do the following.  We first estimate univariate forecast- 
ing  equations  for both  industrial  production  and  unemployment,  and 
then  examine  the  difference  between  the  forecasted  behavior  and  the 
actual behavior  of each  series  following  each shock.  If actual activity is 
less than one would  expect on the basis of the univariate forecast follow- 
ing  monetary  shocks,  this  would  suggest  that  the  change  in  Federal 
Reserve policy  caused  real activity to be lower  than it otherwise  would 
have been. 
The  data  used  in  the  regressions  are  the  same  two  seasonally- 
unadjusted  series  described  above.  For industrial production  we  exam- 
17. The industrial  production  series is from Industrial  Production,  1986  Edition,  Table  A-11. 
The unemployment  series is from  Labor  Force  Statistics  Derived  from  the  Current  Population 
Survey,  1948-87, Table  A-31. The unemployment  series for 1946  and 1947  is taken  from 
various  issues of the Monthly  Labor  Review.  The data for 1946  and 1947  are based on the 
same household survey as later estimates, but have not been revised to take into 
account modern changes in the definition of the labor force. To prevent a spurious 
jump in the series in January  1948, we splice the old and new series together  in this 
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ine the data in percentage  changes  to account for the non-stationarity  of 
the series.  For the unemployment  rate, we look at the data in levels  and 
include  a simple  linear time  trend  to account  for the apparent  upward 
drift  of  the  series  over  time.  For each  series,  the  simple  forecasting 
equation includes  a set of monthly  dummy  variables to account for typi- 
cal seasonal  fluctuations  and 24 own  lags. 
The  own  lags  are  included  to  capture  the  normal  dynamics  of  the 
series. Most important,  we wish to control for the possibility that Federal 
Reserve  policy  tends  to  turn  contractionary  after  periods  of  strong 
growth  that might  naturally be followed  by downturns  even  in the ab- 
Figure  1 ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY  AND MONETARY  SHOCKS. 
a.  Index  of Industrial  Production  (in logarithms) 
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sence of a shift in monetary  policy. The estimation  of the unemployment 
equation  in levels  with  a trend  term included  is done  as an additional 
precaution  in this regard. Because including  a trend term can introduce 
bias toward  detecting  trend  reversion  when  none  is present,  by using 
this procedure  we  may in fact be introducing  some  bias against finding 
real effects of monetary  policy. 
The results of estimating  the equations  suggest  that our specifications 
are adequate  to capture  the  typical behavior  of the  two  series.  The Q- 
statistics  of  the  estimated  regressions  show  that  no  significant  serial 
correlation  remains  when  24 own  lags  are included.  Furthermore,  ex- 
panding  the regressions  to include as many as 48 own lags does not alter 
any important features of the results. 
The forecasting  equations  are estimated  over the period  1948-87.  We 
then  do a dynamic  forecast of both the percentage  change  in industrial 
production  and  the  level  of the  unemployment  rate for the 36 months 
following  each  of  the  six  shocks  identified  above.  The differences  be- 
tween  these  forecasts and actual behavior are shown  in Figures 2 and 3. 
For industrial production,  the figure shows  the cumulative  error at each 
point so that one can more readily identify the impact of the shock on the 
level of industrial production. 
Consider  first industrial  production.  Figure 2 shows  that after each of 
the six times in the postwar  period that the Federal Reserve shifted to a 
policy  of  attempting  to  contract  output  to  reduce  inflation,  industrial 
production  over  the  next  several  years  was  considerably  lower  than 
would  be  predicted  on  the  basis  of  the  past  history  of the  series.  The 
average maximum  departure of industrial production from its forecasted 
path over the three-year  horizon  considered  in the figure is -14%.  The 
smallest maximum  forecast error is -8%  (for the August  1978 shock); the 
largest is -21%  (for the October 1979 shock). 
Figure 3 shows  that  the  results  using  unemployment  are,  with  one 
exception,  similar to those  using  industrial production.  The unemploy- 
ment rate two years after a monetary shock is typically 1.5 to 2.5 percent- 
age points higher than the value predicted from the univariate forecasting 
regression.  The exception is the behavior of unemployment  following  the 
policy shift of December  1968. In this episode,  though industrial produc- 
tion fell sharply  below  its predicted  path,  the unemployment  rate rose 
only slightly  more than the univariate forecasting model predicts. Figure 
1 shows  that unemployment  rose sharply after December 1968, but from 
an extremely  low  level.  Thus,  our forecasting  equation  is implying  that 
the rise in unemployment  was largely predictable simply on the basis of 
normal reversion  toward trend. Since, as mentioned  above, the inclusion 
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Figure  2 CUMULATIVE  FORECAST  ERRORS  OF UNIVARIATE 
AUTOREGRESSIVE  MODEL  FOR  LOG  INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION 
FOLLOWING  MONETARY  SHOCKS. 
a. October  1947 
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reversion  to be overestimated,  Figure 3 may understate  the  size  of the 
unforecastable  increase in unemployment  in this episode. 
In short,  the figures  show  that the negative  monetary  shocks  that we 
have  identified  are  followed  by  marked  downturns  in  real economic 
activity that cannot be predicted  from the past behavior of the economy. 
Furthermore,  the consistency  of the results  suggests  that no one  shock 
will  be  crucial to  any  statistical  summary  of  the  relationship  between 
monetary  disturbances  and  real output.  This finding  is important  be- 
cause although  one could imagine  that in specific episodes  some omitted 
variable (supply  shocks in 1974, for example) might be the source of both 
the real decline  and the Federal Reserve's  policy shift, it seems  unlikely 
that some  omitted  factor is present  in all six of the episodes. 
Another  important  feature  of  the  results  is  that  the  forecast  errors 
typically  do  not  return  to  zero.  For every  shock  except  that  in  1947, 
industrial  production  is  substantially  below  its  forecasted  path  three 
years after the shock.  On average over the six shocks,  industrial produc- 
tion after three years is 7% below  the predicted level; that is, only about 
half of the  maximum  departure  from the  forecasted  path  has been  re- 
versed.  Carrying  the  forecasts  out  further  shows  only  a very  gradual 
return to the predicted  path: the average  forecast error is 6% after four 
years and 4% after five.  The same pattern is present,  though  somewhat 
less strongly, for unemployment;  after four of the six shocks,  the forecast 
errors for  unemployment  remain  substantially  above  zero  after three 
years. 
An  extreme  interpretation  of  this  finding  would  be  that  monetary 
shocks  have  real effects  that  are not  only  substantial  but  permanent. 
However,  as Cochrane  (1988) shows,  simple  autoregressive  procedures 
such as ours cannot  reliably distinguish  between  permanent  effects and 
very long-lasting  but nonetheless  transitory ones.  Hence,  a more moder- 
ate interpretation  is  that our results  imply  that monetary  shocks  have 
very long-lived  effects.  In either case,  since we find that purely nominal 
disturbances  have  highly  persistent  effects,  our results cast grave doubt 
on  arguments  that  the  considerable  persistence  of  output  movements 
suggests  that  demand  disturbances  cannot  be  an  important  source  of 
output  fluctuations  (Nelson  and  Plosser  1982; Campbell  and  Mankiw 
1987). Similarly, our results  suggest  that using  the assumption  that de- 
mand  shocks  have  only  temporary effects as an identifying  assumption 
is likely  to yield  highly  misleading  results  (Blanchard and Quah  1988). 
3.2.2  Statistical Test.  To test  formally  whether  there  is  an  identifiable 
statistical relationship  between  the monetary shocks that we have identi- 
fied and movements  in real output,  we employ  the following  test. To the 150  ROMER  & ROMER 
Figure  3 FORECAST  ERRORS  OF UNIVARIATE  AUTOREGRESSIVE  MODEL 
FOR  THE  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE  FOLLOWING  MONETARY 
SHOCKS. 
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simple  univariate  forecasting  equations  for industrial  production  and 
unemployment  described  above,  we  add current and lagged  values  of a 
dummy  variable that is equal to one in each of the six months  in which 
we  have  identified  a change  in Federal Reserve  policy  and  zero  in all 
other months.  The impulse  response  function for this expanded  forecast- 
ing equation  provides  an estimate  of the total effect of a policy  change 
after some  horizon.  The standard error of the impulse  response  function 
provides  a way  of  gauging  whether  the  effects  of the  nominal  distur- 
bances are statistically significant. 
Since the dummy  variable is the crucial indicator of monetary shocks, 
it is  useful  to  describe  its  specification  more  thoroughly.  This variable 
simply identifies  the six months  when  the Federal Reserve made a deci- 
sion to try to cause a recession  to reduce inflation.  The variable does not 
indicate how long the shocks lasted or attempt to differentiate the shocks 
by size.  The decision  not  to specify  duration  was  motivated  largely by 
the  fact that  the  ends  of  these  contractionary  policies  are often  much 
more gradual and difficult to identify  than the adoptions  of the policies. 
The decision  to give  each  shock  an equal weight  was  motivated  by the 
fact that  our  reading  of  the  FOMC minutes  and  the  Record of  Policy 
Actions  did not provide  evidence  of large differences  in the severities  of 
the intended  downturns  or a way of calibrating those intentions. 
As before,  the equation  is estimated  for both the percentage change in 
industrial  production  and  the  level  of the unemployment  rate. The ac- 
tual equation  that is estimated  is: 
11  24  36 
yt = ao+  Z  ai Mit +  X  bjYt-j+  L  ckDtk,  (1) 
i=l  j=1  k=0 
where  y is either the change  in log industrial  production  or the level  of 
the unemployment  rate, M is a set of monthly  dummy  variables, and D 
is the dummy  variable for contractionary monetary  shocks.  For the un- 
employment  equation  a simple  linear time  trend is also included.  The 
regressions  are run over the period  1948-87. 
The estimation  results for the industrial production equation are given 
in Table 1.  Over  two-thirds  of  the  coefficients  on  the  monetary  shock 
variable are negative  and twelve  of them have t-statistics less than -1.0. 
The predominance  of negative  coefficients,  like the  pictures  described 
above,  suggests  that negative  monetary  shocks  do indeed  depress  real 
output.  The fact that many of the coefficients  have large standard errors 
indicates  that  the  timing  of  the  response  of  real output  is  somewhat 
variable.  This,  however,  is  not  surprising  given  that we  are trying  to Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  153 
Table 1  BASIC INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION REGRESSION 
SAMPLE PERIOD: February 1948-December  1987 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Percentage  Change in 
Industrial Production 
Lagged  Changes  in Industrial 
Dummy  for Shift  in Monetary  Policy  Production 
























































































































































































R2 =  .825 
S.E.E. =  .0132 
Q(63) = 53.75 
Coefficients  and standard errors for the constant  term and monthly  dummies  are not reported. 154 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
pinpoint  the response  at a monthly  frequency. Indeed,  what is perhaps 
more surprising  is that the response  in some  of the months  is estimated 
so precisely. 
A natural way  to summarize  the response  of industrial production  to 
the monetary  shock variable is to examine the impulse response  function 
implied  by  the  estimated  equation.  In  our  specification,  the  impulse 
response  function  traces  out  the  effect  of  a unit  shock  to  the  dummy 
variable (D),  including  the  feedback  effect through  lagged  output.  The 
36-month  impulse  response  function  for the industrial production  equa- 
tion is given  in Figure 4.18  The figure also shows  the one standard error 
bands for the impulse  response  function.19 
The impulse  response  function  shows  that for the first several months 
following  a monetary  shock  there is little effect on real output.  Output 
then falls drastically at the ends of both the first and second years, with a 
slight  plateau  early  in  the  second  year.  The  maximum  impact  occurs 
after 33 months  and indicates  that a shock causes  the level of real indus- 
trial production  to be approximately  12% lower than it would  have been 
had the shock not occurred. 
From the confidence  bands,  it is clear that this effect is not only large, 
but also highly  statistically significant.  For example,  the t-statistic for the 
impulse  response  function  at 33 months  is -3.4.  The effect of monetary 
shocks  on real production  is thus significantly  different from zero at the 
99% confidence  level. 
Another  way  to measure  the statistical significance  of our results is to 
ask  how  likely  one  would  be  to  obtain  estimated  effects  as  strong  as 
those  shown  in Figure 4 using  random dates for shocks.  Specifically, we 
performed 200 trials of an experiment  in which  we replaced the dummy 
variable in  equation  (1) with  a dummy  set  equal  to one  in six months 
chosen  randomly  over  the  period  1947-85.  The  estimated  maximum 
depressing  effect  of the  Monte  Carlo dummy  on industrial  production 
over  a 36-month  horizon  exceeded  the  12% figure  obtained  with  our 
dummy  for genuine  monetary  shocks  in just  one  trial. Thus,  it is  ex- 
tremely unlikely  that our results could arise by chance. 
Figure 4 also confirms the impression  gained from Figure 2 that mone- 
tary shocks  have  real effects  that are very long-lasting.  By the end of 36 
months  only  a quarter of the maximum  negative  effect of the monetary 
shock  has  been  undone.  Furthermore,  if one  includes  an additional  24 
18. As in Figure 2, Figure 4 shows  the cumulative  sum of the impulse  responses  so that the 
effect  of the  shock  on  the  log  level  of industrial  production  can be seen  more easily. 
19. The standard errors are calculated using  the formula for the asymptotic  standard error 
of a non-linear  function  of the regression  paramenters.  See Poterba, Rotemberg,  and 
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lags  of  the  monetary  shock  dummy  in  the  basic  regression  and  then 
continues  the  impulse  response  function  out  an additional  24 months, 
the  negative  effects  of  a monetary  shock  still linger.  Five years  after a 
monetary  shock,  industrial  production  is  still 7% lower  than  it would 
have  been  had  the  Federal  Reserve  not  decided  to attempt  to cause  a 
recession. 
The empirical  results  for unemployment  confirm those  for industrial 
production.  Table 2 shows  the coefficient  estimates  for the equation  for 
the  unemployment  rate.  The impulse  response  function  and  standard 
error bands  for the unemployment  regression  are given in Figure 5. The 
figure shows  that unemployment  begins  to rise sharply 18 months  after 
the shock and reaches its maximum at 34 months.  The total impact of the 
shock  after 34 months  is that the unemployment  rate is 2.1 percentage 
points  higher  than it otherwise  would  have been. 
The standard error bands for the impulse  response  function for unem- 
ployment  indicate  that  the  depressing  effect  of  a  monetary  shock  is 
highly  statistically  significant.  The  t-statistics  are  over  2.0  for  all  the 
impulse  responses  after month  20 and  are often  over  3.0.  In a Monte 
Carlo experiment  analogous  to that for industrial production,  the maxi- 
mum  estimated  impact  of the  Monte  Carlo dummy  on unemployment 
over  a 36-month  horizon  never  exceeded  2.1  percentage  points  in 200 
trials. 
The results  of the statistical test indicate  that monetary  policy  shocks 
Figure  4 IMPULSE  RESPONSE  FUNCTION  FOR  BASIC  INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION  REGRESSION 
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Notes: The  impulse  response  function  shows  the  impact  of  a  unit  shock  to  the  monetary  dummy 
variable. The impulse  responses  for the change  in industrial production  have been cumulated  to reflect 
the effect on the log level.  The coefficient  estimates  used  to generate  the impulse  response  function are 
given in Table 1. The dashed  lines  show  the one  standard error bands. 156 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
Table  2  BASIC  UNEMPLOYMENT  REGRESSION 
SAMPLE  PERIOD:  January  1948-December  1987 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE:  Unemployment  Rate 
Dummy  for Shift  in Monetary  Policy  Lagged  Unemployment  Rates 
Lag  Coefficient  Standard  Error  Lag  Coefficient  Standard  Error 
0  -.0979  .1272 
1  -.1049  .1272  1  1.0539  .0496 
2  .0460  .1274  2  .1091  .0718 
3  .0692  .1167  3  -.1685  .0720 
4  .0799  .1166  4  .0313  .0724 
5  -.0004  .1164  5  -.0140  .0722 
6  .1369  .1161  6  -.0659  .0714 
7  .0266  .1163  7  -.0371  .0713 
8  .0784  .1160  8  .0844  .0712 
9  .2989  .1157  9  -.0360  .0704 
10  -.0709  .1162  10  -.0389  .0704 
11  -.1461  .1162  11  .0881  .0707 
12  -.0692  .1165  12  .1659  .0693 
13  -.0326  .1162  13  -.2807  .0690 
14  .1691  .1179  14  -.0191  .0705 
15  .1168  .1181  15  .0113  .0708 
16  .0533  .1182  16  .0521  .0704 
17  .0162  .1179  17  .0529  .0702 
18  .0712  .1176  18  -.0967  .0706 
19  .1652  .1175  19  .1399  .0707 
20  .1053  .1177  20  -.0852  .0711 
21  .2589  .1178  21  .0100  .0708 
22  -.0212  .1183  22  .0741  .0702 
23  .0320  .1170  23  -.1261  .0702 
24  .2330  .1170  24  .0668  .0487 
25  -.1101  .1172 
26  .3029  .1173 
27  .2415  .1181 
28  .1263  .1190 
29  .1379  .1190 
30  .0645  .1184 
31  -.0008  .1182 
32  -.0712  .1181 
33  .1046  .1169 
34  -.0071  .1169 
35  -.0202  .1168 
36  -.0824  .1168 
R2  = .981 
S.E.E. =  .267 
Q(63) =  56.25 
Coefficients  and  standard  errors  for  the  constant  term,  the  trend,  and  monthly  dummies  are  not 
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have  potent  real  effects.  There  remains,  however,  the  question  of 
whether  the  monetary  shocks  we  identify  actually  account  for a large 
fraction of the total variation in real activity. Figure 1 provides  informal 
evidence  that monetary  shocks  are indeed  an important  source  of real 
fluctuations.  It shows  not just that each of our shocks was followed  by a 
sharp  rise  in  unemployment,  but  also  that  there  have  been  only  two 
sharp  rises  in  unemployment  in  the  postwar  period  not  preceded  by 
such  shocks.  In other  words,  six of the  eight  postwar  recessions  have 
been preceded  by decisions  by the Federal Reserve to attempt to cause a 
downturn. 
To formalize  the  impression  given  by  Figure  1, we  first regress  the 
monthly  level of the unemployment  rate on a constant,  seasonal dummy 
variables,  and  a trend.  We then  run  the  same  regression  including  36 
lags of our monetary  shock  dummy  variable. That is, we  run the same 
regression  as in (1) above,  except that we do not include any of the own 
lags  of  the  unemployment  rate.  The  equation  including  the  monetary 
shock variable has  a sum  of squared  residuals  that is 21% smaller than 
that of the  simple  seasonal  regression.  This difference  is very  large.  It 
implies  that,  by  itself,  our  simple  dummy  variable  for  overt  Federal 
Reserve policy  decisions  to create a recession  can account for more than 
a fifth of the non-seasonal  variation in the postwar unemployment  rate. 
These  results  strongly  suggest  that aggregate  demand  disturbances, 
Figure  5 IMPULSE  RESPONSE  FUNCTION  FOR  BASIC  UNEMPLOYMENT 
REGRESSION. 
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Notes:  The  impulse  response  function  shows the impact  of a unit shock  to the monetary  dummy  variable 
on the level of the unemployment  rate  (expressed  in percentage  points).  The coefficient  estimates  used 
to generate  the impulse  response  function  are  given in Table  2. The  dashed  lines show the one standard 
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rather than real shocks,  are the predominant  source of economic  fluctua- 
tions.  Our simple  dummy  variable surely captures only a small fraction 
of demand  disturbances.  It is a very crude measure of only one aspect of 
monetary policy, and it neglects  all non-monetary  demand  disturbances, 
such  as changes  in fiscal policy  and in private demand,  entirely. Since 
the  dummy  variable  alone  accounts  for a substantial  fraction of  (non- 
seasonal)  postwar  fluctuations,  it follows  that aggregate demand  distur- 
bances as a whole  almost  surely account for a much larger fraction. 
3.2.3 Robustness.  While the results appear clear cut, one naturally wor- 
ries about  the  robustness  of any  empirical  finding.  In the  case  of this 
study,  the main concern  is that the decisions  by the Federal Reserve  to 
try to create a recession  might be correlated with  other factors. If this is 
true, then these  other factors, rather than the monetary shocks we have 
identified,  could be the true source of the movements  in real output. 
We have already provided  several pieces of evidence  that indicate that 
this  is not  a likely  possibility.  First, the  earlier part of this  section  dis- 
cusses  the rationale given  by the System  for its decisions  to try to shift 
back the  aggregate  demand  curve.  While  inflation  was  the  proximate 
cause  in each  case,  the  perceived  cause  of the inflation  differed  across 
the  episodes  that  we  consider.  For example,  in  1968 it  was  wartime 
expenditures,  while  in 1974 it was earlier oil price shocks and expansion- 
ary monetary  policy. The fact that there was no consistent  source of the 
inflation  that the Federal Reserve  wished  to cure suggests  that there is 
no  consistent  alternative  factor that was  present  in  each  instance  of a 
shift to anti-inflationary  monetary  policy. 
Second,  Figures 2 and 3 show  that the behavior of real activity relative 
to predicted  following  each of our shocks  is quite similar. This suggests 
that even  if some  other factor were causing inflation and depressing  real 
output  in one  or two  of the periods  in which  we  have identified  mone- 
tary shocks,  this other factor could  not be driving  the results.  We have 
tested  this  assertion  by  eliminating  each  shock  in turn and  examining 
the  resulting  impulse  response  functions.  After  each  elimination,  the 
impulse  response  functions  appear nearly identical to those in Figures 4 
and 5.20 
Third, our discussion  of the simple forecasting equations  stressed  that 
24 lags of the percentage  change  in industrial production  or the level of 
20. Even though it does not represent  a monetary  shock  by our criteria,  the "credit  crunch" 
of 1965-66 is often characterized  as an important  episode of tight monetary  policy.  We 
have therefore  investigated  the effects  of adding  a shock  in December  1965.  We  find the 
results are essentially unchanged by this addition. Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  159 
the unemployment  rate are adequate  for capturing any natural tendency 
of real activity to decline  after it has been growing  briskly for some time. 
This means  that if the Federal Reserve  simply  said it wished  to cause a 
recession  whenever  a temporary  boom  was  about  to end,  these  state- 
ments  would  not have  any explanatory  power  once  the own  lags were 
included  in  the  regression.  The  results  in  Figures  2-5  and  Tables 1-2 
above clearly show  that this is not the case.21 
In addition  to these  pieces  of evidence,  it is possible  to control explic- 
itly for other  factors that one  might  fear accounted  for our results.  We 
consider  three  types  of  other  factors.  They  are  supply  shocks,  fiscal 
policy, and inflation itself. 
Supply  shocks  are a natural source of concern: it is possible  that sup- 
ply  shocks  could  both  generate  inflation  to which  the Federal Reserve 
wished  to respond  and directly depress  real output.  In this regard, it is 
important to point  out that supply  shocks  that occurred in the past and 
were  accommodated  by  expansionary  aggregate  demand  policy  are of 
no concern.  These  shocks  would  have caused  the inflation that the Fed- 
eral Reserve wished  to cure but would  no longer be having a depressing 
effect on real activity. 
To ensure that supply  shocks do not account for our results, we do two 
things.  First,  we  try  eliminating  the  two  monetary  shocks  that  could 
plausibly  be  associated  with  the  oil  price rises  of the  1970s (1974 and 
1979). This change  reduces  the maximum impact of a shock slightly (the 
trough  of  the  impulse  response  function  for  industrial  production  is 
-.10  rather than  -.12),  but the results are otherwise  unchanged. 
Second,  we add a measure of supply shocks to our regressions.  Follow- 
ing conventional  practice, we capture supply conditions  by including the 
current and first 36 lags of the monthly  percentage change in the relative 
price of food and energy in our regressions.22 We find that accounting for 
21. A related  point  concerns  our method  for identifying  shocks.  To identify  a change  in 
monetary  policy  we  often  use  Federal Reserve  records for up to six months  after the 
apparent  change.  We do this because  shifts in policy are often not sufficiently  sudden 
or  dramatic  that  they  can  be  identified  from,  for example,  the  records  of  a  single 
meeting.  This introduces  a slight  possibility  of bias: if the  System  has a tendency  to 
state that it was  attempting  to create a downturn  only if evidence  that there will be a 
downturn  has appeared,  our test will overstate  the effects of shifts in policy. To ensure 
that this possible  bias is not affecting  our results,  we  look at the forecast errors of the 
simple  univariate  forecasts  starting  six months  after each  shock.  Even with  these  six 
extra months  of actual data,  however,  the declines  in output  that occur following  the 
monetary  shocks  cannot be predicted. 
22. The relative price of food and energy  is measured  as the ratio of a weighted  average of 
the producer  price indexes  for crude  foodstuffs  and feedstuffs,  crude fuel,  and crude 
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supply  shocks  barely  alters  the  results.  For industrial  production  the 
cumulative  impact  of a monetary  shock  is actually slightly  larger when 
supply  shocks  are included  in the  regression  than  when  they  are not. 
For unemployment  the maximum  impact of a monetary shock is slightly 
smaller for the  expanded  regression  than for the  simple  regression.  In 
both  cases  the  supply  shock  variable has little impact on the timing  or 
the  significance  of  the  impulse  response  functions  for  the  monetary 
shock variable.23 
Another  factor that one  might  worry could  account for our results  is 
fiscal  policy.  It could  be  the  case  that  whenever  the  Federal  Reserve 
became  concerned  about  inflation  and  decided  to  attempt  to  cause  a 
recession,  the  fiscal  authorities  also  shifted  to  a  more  contractionary 
policy. This possibility  does  not appear particularly likely. In the Federal 
Reserve  records  there  is certainly no  mention  that the anti-inflationary 
changes  in  monetary  policy  are  designed  to  reinforce  shifts  in  fiscal 
policy. Furthermore,  given  the  inside  lags  of fiscal policy, it seems  un- 
likely  that  the  fiscal  authorities  could  change  spending  and  taxes  to 
match the timing of monetary  policy very closely. 
Nevertheless,  it is  perhaps  useful  to  test  whether  a correlation  be- 
tween  monetary  and fiscal policies  could be present and could affect the 
results.  To do this, we add to our regressions  the current and first 12 lags 
of the quarterly change  in the ratio of the nominal  government  budget 
surplus to nominal  GNP.24  This variable should  obviously  capture any of 
the demand  side  effects  of fiscal policy. At the same  time,  because  the 
deficit  is  highly  correlated  with  government  purchases,  this  variable 
should  also capture any  supply  side  effects that government  purchases 
might  have  through  the  interest  rate  and  labor  supply.  Thus,  it  can 
control for another possible  source of supply  shocks. 
Including  the fiscal policy variable lowers  the cumulative  effect of the 
monetary  shock  variable  only  slightly.  For both  industrial  production 
and unemployment,  a monetary  shock  still causes  a large downturn  in 
economic  activity that is statistically significant at at least the 99% confi- 
dence  level.  Thus,  the apparent response  of the real economy  to mone- 
23. The same results obtain when  alternative measures  of supply  shocks are used.  Among 
the  variants  we  have  tried  are the  percentage  change  in  the  relative  price of  crude 
petroleum  and  the  percentage  change  in  the  relative  price of all crude  materials  for 
further processing. 
24. The budget  surplus data are from the National Income and Product Accounts  and cover 
both the federal government  and state and local governments.  Quarterly observations 
were  included  by assuming  that the deficit to GNP ratio was constant  over a quarter, 
and  then  measuring  the  change  in  the  ratio between  the  current  month  and  three 
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tary shocks  cannot  be ascribed to possible  correlations of monetary  dis- 
turbances with  government  spending.25 
A final additional  factor that we  consider  is inflation.  It is difficult to 
think of a plausible  channel  through  which  inflation by itself (indepen- 
dent of supply  shocks)  might directly depress  real output.  Nevertheless, 
since inflation  is obviously  present  during each of our episodes,  it may 
be useful  to check whether  allowing  for a direct effect of inflation on real 
activity alters our results.  To do this, we include  the current and first 36 
lags of the  monthly  percentage  change  in the producer price index  for 
finished  goods  in our basic regression.  For industrial production,  includ- 
ing inflation has virtually no effect on the shape,  amplitude,  or statistical 
significance  of the impulse  response  function  for a monetary  shock.  For 
unemployment,  including  inflation  reduces  the  size  of  the  total  real 
effect of the monetary  shock somewhat,  but the cumulative  impact after 
33 months  is still large and positive.  In sum,  in this case, as in the other 
cases discussed,  the result that monetary shocks matter tremendously  is 
robust to the inclusion  of additional  explanatory variables. 
4. Friedman  and  Schwartz  Revisited 
A natural next step in our analysis  is to return to the interwar period to 
see what evidence  the narrative approach sheds  on the effects of mone- 
tary shocks  in  this  era.  We  do  this  with  some  trepidation,  however, 
because  as we  argue  in Section  2,  we  believe  that the identification  of 
monetary disturbances  in the period before 1947 can never be as clear cut 
or convincing  as it is in the  postwar  era. Nevertheless,  since  Section  2 
suggests  an alternative  list of interwar shocks and Section 3 suggests  an 
empirical  test  for  the  relationship  between  monetary  shocks  and  real 
output,  it seems  useful  to investigate  how, if at all, employing  a revised 
version  of the narrative approach affects Friedman and Schwartz's con- 
clusion  that monetary  disturbances  had  severe  real effects in the inter- 
war era. 
Specification.  In Section 2 we discuss  in detail Friedman and Schwartz's 
identification  of monetary  shocks  in the interwar period.  We argue that 
25. Using the ratio of the cyclically-adjusted  federal budget  surplus to nominal GNP rather 
than  the  fiscal  policy  measure  employed  in  the  text has  essentially  no  effect  on  the 
results.  Specifically,  we  employ  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  measure  of  the 
cyclically-adjusted  surplus  (from  CITIBASE), which  is  available  beginning  in  1955. 
Adding  the  current  and  first twelve  lags  of the  quarterly change  in the  ratio of this 
measure to nominal  GNP to our basic regression  estimated over the period 1958-87 has 
virtually no impact on the estimated  impact of the monetary shock dummy. 162 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
there may be some  bias in their choices,  and thus that the list of shocks 
they focus  on may not be the most appropriate one.  For our basic inter- 
war test we  therefore  consider  a list of shocks  somewhat  different from 
Friedman and Schwartz's.  In particular, we identify  monetary shocks in 
five months  of the interwar period: January 1920, October 1931, Febru- 
ary 1933, January 1937, and  September  1941. This list differs from that 
considered  by  Friedman  and  Schwartz  by  adding  shocks  in  February 
1933 and September  1941 and by not including  any shock in the first two 
years of the Great Depression. 
Our reasons  for identifying  shocks  in 1933 and  1941 are described  in 
Section  2.  We have  two  reasons  for not  including  a shock  in the early 
stages of the Great Depression.  First, our concern throughout  the paper 
has been  with  whether  Federal Reserve policy actions have real effects. 
Since  whatever  monetary  disturbance  may  have  occurred in  the  early 
part of the  Depression  involved  inaction  rather than active  changes  in 
monetary  policy, it seems  reasonable  to exclude  it. Second,  because  the 
interpretation  of monetary  developments  in the early stages of the Great 
Depression  is so controversial,  we  do not want  our results to be driven 
by  the  identification  of  a shock  in  this  period.  However,  because  the 
most appropriate  selection  of shocks  for the interwar period is not clear 
cut, below  we  consider  alternatives  to our basic list. 
Given  our  list  of  shocks,  it  is  straightforward  to  implement  the 
statistical  test  of  the  real  effects  of  monetary  disturbances  that  we 
use  in  the  previous  section.  As  before,  we  define  a monetary  shock 
dummy  variable  that  is  equal  to  one  in  each  of  the  months  in  which 
we  identify  a  shock.  The  data  on  real  output  that  we  use  are  the 
standard  Federal  Reserve  Board monthly  index  of total industrial  pro- 
duction,  which  begins  in  1919.26 The  equation  that  we  estimate  is 
26. We use the most recent version of this series (given in Industrial  Production,  1986)  and 
again  use seasonally  unadjusted  data.  While  the FRB  index  is the best and most compre- 
hensive monthly index of production  avaiable  for the interwar  period, it is not without 
problems. Most important,  there is a break  in the series in 1923. For the period after 
1923,  the FRB  revised its original  index to have broader  coverage  by including  data on 
manhours for those industries where direct measures of physical production were 
unavailable. This revision was not carried  back to the period 1919-23 because the 
necessary  data were unavailable.  This difference  in procedures  is potentially  important 
because the inclusion of the manhours data tends to reduce the volatility  of the FRB 
index after 1923. This means that some of the relatively  dramatic  movements in the 
index for 1919-23 would probably  disappear  if the earlier  series  were constructed  using 
the same methods as the later  index. 
Because  we want to include the 1920  monetary  shock, starting  the estimation  in 1923 
and thus using only the unbroken  series is not possible. However, to test whether the 
inconsistency  in the data affects our empirical  results, we do the following. Since the 
revision  of the Fed series to include manhour  data  was not done until 1940,  there  exists 
a consistently bad FRB  index for 1919  to 1940.  We can use this consistent series in the Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  163 
identical  to  that  given  in  equation  (1) above.  The estimation  period  is 
1921-44. 
Results.  The coefficient  estimates  of this regression  are given in Table 3. 
Figure 6 shows  the corresponding  impulse  response  function,  together 
with  the  one  standard  error bands.  The point  estimates  suggest  a very 
potent  effect  of  monetary  shocks  on  real economic  activity. The  esti- 
mated maximum  effect of a monetary shock on industrial production is a 
fall of 20% after 18 months. 
While the real effect of a monetary shock in the interwar era appears to 
be large,  it is not  estimated  precisely.  Over months  10 to 18, when  the 
effect  is  largest,  the  departure  of  the  impulse  response  function  from 
zero  is  1.5  to  2  times  the  associated  standard  error. This  implies  the 
hypothesis  that the effect is zero is only  marginally rejected at conven- 
tional  significance  levels.  Thus,  while  the  interwar  results  are entirely 
consistent  with our finding  for the postwar period that monetary distur- 
bances  have  large real effects,  they  do not by themselves  provide  over- 
whelming  evidence  of those  effects. 
At the same time,  the timing of the real effects of monetary  shocks in 
the basic  interwar  regression  is quite  different  from the  timing  of real 
effects in the postwar  regressions.  In both eras the effect over the first six 
months  is  small.  However,  in the  next  twelve  months  the  response  is 
much  more  abrupt and  severe  in the  interwar era than in the postwar 
era.  The  estimated  impact  of  an  interwar  monetary  shock  plummets 
from essentially  zero  five  months  after the shock  to  -17%  after eleven 
months.  Industrial  production  then  falls  irregularly  to  its  trough  of 
-20%  after 18 months.  Then,  again in sharp contrast to the results  for 
the postwar period,  there is a strong rebound,  with the effect rising from 
-20%  to -3%  by month  23 and disappearing  entirely by month 29. 
In short,  our results  suggest  that the effects  of demand  disturbances 
were both more rapid and less  persistent  in the interwar era than in the 
postwar  period.  An  obvious  implication  of this finding  is that-in  con- 
trast to the position  taken by De Long and Summers (1988) and others- 
an explanation  of the change  in the overall persistence  properties of real 
output  after World War II should  be  sought  in changes  in the  mecha- 
nisms  that determine  the economy's  response  to a given  type of shock, 
rather than in changes  in the nature of the shocks themselves. 
regressions  and see if it yields  results that are noticeably different from those based on 
the inconsistent  series.  We find that the results are very similar for both the consistent 
and  inconsistent  data.  We therefore  opt  for the  inconsistent  data because  they  exist 
after 1940 and  thus  allow  us  to examine  the real effects  of the rise in reserve  require- 
ments  in late 1941. 164 *  ROMER & ROMER 
Table 3  BASIC INTERWAR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION REGRESSION 
SAMPLE PERIOD: February 1921-December  1944 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Percentage  Change in 
Industrial Production 
Lagged  Changes  in Industrial 
Dummy for Change in Monetary Policy  Production 
























































































































































































R2 =  .652 
S.E.E. =  .0270 
Q(48) =  18.08 
Coefficients  and standard errors for the constant  term and monthly  dummies  are not reported. Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  165 
Figure  6 IMPULSE  RESPONSE  FUNCTION  FOR  BASIC  INTERWAR 
INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION  REGRESSION 
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Notes:  The impulse response function shows the impact of a unit shock to the monetary  dummy 
variable.  The impulse responses for the change  in industrial  production  have been cumulated  to reflect 
the effect  on the log level. The coefficient  estimates  used to generate  the impulse  response  function  are 
given in Table  3. The dashed lines show the one standard  error  bands. 
Robustness.  As with  our postwar  regressions,  it is important to investi- 
gate  whether  our  results  for the  interwar  era are being  driven  by  the 
omission  of other potentially  relevant variables. Because our list of inter- 
war monetary  shocks  includes  one in the aftermath of World War I and 
another  shortly  before  the  outbreak of World War II, the most  obvious 
omitted  variable is some  measure  of fiscal policy. 
We attempt to account for the effects of fiscal policy in two ways.  Our 
first approach is to control directly for the effects of fiscal policy. We do 
this by including  in the regression  the current and two lagged values  of 
the  change  since  the  previous  year  of  the  ratio of  the  federal  budget 
surplus  to nominal  GNP.27  Adding  this  variable has  little effect  on  the 
results.  The coefficients  on the fiscal policy variables are of the expected 
sign  (that is,  a decrease  in the  surplus  increases  output),  but they  are 
small and statistically insignificant.  The impulse  response  function for a 
monetary  shock in this expanded  regression  is virtually identical to that 
for the basic interwar regression. 
The  second  method  that we  use  to  deal  with  the  possible  effects  of 
fiscal policy is to exclude  the two shocks associated  with the World Wars 
27. The budget  variable used  is the nominal  administrative  budget  surplus or deficit given 
in the statistical appendix  of the Annual Report  of the Secretary  of the Treasury,  1980, Table 
2. The nominal  GNP numbers  are from Romer, 1988a, Table 5, and the National Income 
and Product Accounts of the U.S.,  Table 1. Both the budget  and  the GNP data are only 
available annually.  Monthly  figures  are set equal to the annual value and changes  are 
calculated in multiples  of 12. 166 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
and shorten  the sample  period  to February 1922-December  1940. These 
changes  greatly strengthen  the estimated  effect of monetary shocks.  The 
maximum  depressing  effect of a monetary  shock is now  a fall in indus- 
trial production  of 41%. The timing of the effects is essentially  the same 
as for the basic interwar regression. 
Finally, it is natural to contrast  our results  with  those  that would  be 
obtained  using  Friedman  and  Schwartz's  list of shocks.  To do this,  we 
define  an alternative  monetary  shock  dummy  variable that is equal to 
one in the five months  in the interwar era when  Friedman and Schwartz 
identify  a  monetary  shock:  January 1920,  October  1930,  March  1931, 
October  1931,  and  January  1937.  The  five  shocks  include  the  "three 
crucial experiments,"  plus  two  shocks  early  in  the  Great Depression 
corresponding  to the beginnings  of the first two waves  of banking  fail- 
ures.28 The  specification  is  otherwise  the  same  as  our basic  one.  The 
sample  period  is February 1921-December  1944; no  deficit  measure  is 
included. 
The impulse  response  function  for this regression  is given  in Figure 7 
and shows,  not surprisingly, that using Friedman and Schwartz's choices 
of shocks rather than ours greatly increases the estimated effects of mone- 
tary disturbances.  The maximum  effect of a monetary shock on real out- 
put is now  a fall of 35% rather than 20% and is overwhelmingly,  rather 
than marginally, significant.  The pattern of the responses  is similar to that 
obtained  using  our preferred list of shocks.  The only noteworthy  differ- 
ence is that in Figure 7 output  recovers only two-thirds  of its maximum 
loss after 36 months  rather than all. 
Overall, the results from the interwar regressions  support the postwar 
finding  that monetary  disturbances  have  very large effects  on real eco- 
nomic activity. They are thus also supportive  of Friedman and Schwartz's 
belief that money  mattered tremendously  in the interwar period. In fact, 
they  may  actually  strengthen  Friedman  and  Schwartz's  conclusion  be- 
cause they indicate that the lagged effects of monetary shocks are shorter 
and  sharper  than  informal  statistical  procedures  led  Friedman  and 
Schwartz to believe.29 
28. It is  difficult  to  date  precisely  the  monetary  shock  (or  shocks)  that  Friedman  and 
Schwartz  associate  with  the early stages  of the Great Depression.  We choose  October 
1930 and March 1931 because  it is in reference to the banking crises that Friedman and 
Schwartz  are  most  emphatic  in  arguing  that  monetary  policy  was  highly  unusual. 
Including  only  the  "three  crucial experiments"  rather than  all five  shocks  has  little 
effect on the results. 
29. An obvious  implication  of the conclusion  that monetary policy had large real effects in 
the interwar period is that the Great Depression  would  have been less severe if mone- 
tary policy  had  been  less  contractionary.  In that sense,  our results  are supportive  of 
Friedman  and  Schwartz's  interpretation  of  the  Depression.  But since,  as  described 
above,  neither  we  nor Friedman and Schwartz detect an active monetary  shock at the Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  ?  167 
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Figure  7 IMPULSE  RESPONSE  FUNCTION  FOR  INTERWAR  INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION  REGRESSION  USING  FRIEDMAN  AND 
SCHWAPTZ'S  SHOCKS 
0.1  ,,,I,,,[,,,[I,,[I,l][I[lII]IlI,,,i 
0.0  . - 
-0.1-  '  I  . 
-0.2  - 
-0.3- 
-0.4-  '..... 
-0O5 1  1  1  1  1  1  11  I 
5  10  15  20  25  30  35 
MONTHS  AFTER SHOCK 
Notes:  The impulse response function shows the impact of a unit shock to the monetary  dummy 
variable.  The impulse responses for the change  in industrial  production  have been cumulated  to reflect 
the effect  on the log level. The dashed lines show the one standard  error  bands. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is based  on  two  premises.  The first is that the narrative ap- 
proach is the method  that is most likely to be persuasive  in resolving  the 
question  of whether  monetary  disturbances  have real effects. The use of 
the narrative approach  allows  a vast body  of information that cannot be 
employed  in conventional  statistical tests  to be brought  to bear on  this 
question.  And it is this additional information that can solve the problem 
of identifying  the  direction  of causation  between  monetary  factors and 
real economic  developments.  The second  premise is that employing  the 
narrative approach is difficult. Using it casually, as is typically done,  can 
lead to bias,  either in the interpretation  of the historical record or in the 
inference  that one  draws about the real effects of monetary shocks. 
This paper  is therefore  an attempt  to employ  the narrative approach 
carefully and systematically  to study  the real effects of monetary distur- 
bances.  The first and  last parts of the paper focus  on the interwar era, 
and are thus  largely a reexamination  of Friedman and Schwartz's path- 
breaking work. The middle  and more important part considers  evidence 
onset of the Depression, and since there is strong evidence of non-monetary  shocks, 
the severe initial downturn was most likely largely  the result  of non-monetary  forces. 
Furthermore,  because our results do not provide  an estimate  of the size of the effect of 
a given monetary  change, we cannot determine  how much less severe the subsequent 
depression might have been under any particular  alternative  policy. 168 *  ROMER  & ROMER 
for the period  after World War II. From these  two  types  of analysis  we 
reach five conclusions. 
First, in the postwar  era there have been a series of episodes  in which 
the  Federal  Reserve  has  in  effect  deliberately  attempted  to  induce  a 
recession  to  decrease  inflation.  These  episodes  are virtually  ideal  for 
employing  the narrative approach because monetary shocks can be iden- 
tified  using  a  narrow  and  concrete  set  of  criteria that  are  consistent 
across episodes.  Economic  developments  following  these  shifts in Fed- 
eral Reserve policy provide decisive  evidence  of the importance of mone- 
tary  policy.  In  every  case,  output  fell  substantially  below  what  one 
would  otherwise  have  expected.  A  shift  to  anti-inflationary  monetary 
policy led,  on average,  to an ultimate reduction in industrial production 
of 12% and an ultimate rise in the unemployment  rate of two percentage 
points.  These effects  are highly  statistically significant. 
Second,  in  the  postwar  era the  maximum  depressing  effect  of anti- 
inflationary  shifts  in monetary  policy  occurs after roughly  two and one 
half  years,  and  there  appears  to  be  only  a limited  tendency  for  real 
activity to then return toward its pre-shock path. In other words,  the real 
effects of demand  disturbances  appear to be highly  persistent. 
Third,  our  extremely  narrowly  defined  monetary  disturbances  ac- 
count  for a considerable  fraction  of  fluctuations  in  postwar  economic 
activity: our dummy  variable for negative  shifts  in policy  accounts  for 
more  than  a fifth of the  variation  in detrended,  deseasonalized  unem- 
ployment  in  the postwar  period.  Because  we  find that demand  distur- 
bances  have  real effects  and  because  our simple  measure  of monetary 
shocks  almost  surely  captures  only  a small fraction of demand  fluctua- 
tions,  our results  strongly  suggest  that demand  disturbances  are a pri- 
mary source of postwar  economic  fluctuations. 
Fourth,  the  narrative approach  is extremely  difficult to implement  in 
the interwar period.  There is so much variation in monetary institutions 
and  doctrines  and  in  economic  events  that  it is  almost  impossible  to 
study  the historical record of the period systematically.  When the set of 
monetary  disturbances  for the  interwar  period  that,  in  our judgment, 
comes  as close  as possible  to being  free of bias is considered,  the inter- 
war  evidence  is  also  supportive  of  the  view  that monetary  policy  has 
large real effects.  The estimated  maximum  effect of a monetary  distur- 
bance for this period is a reduction  in industrial production  of 20%. 
Fifth and  last,  the  real effects  of  monetary  shocks  in  the  period  be- 
tween  World War I and  World War II do not appear to be long-lasting. 
Our estimates  imply  that by 33 months  after a shock,  output  has essen- 
tially returned  to the path it would  have  followed  in the absence  of the 
shock.  Thus our results  imply that demand  disturbances have large real Does  Monetary  Policy  Matter?  *  169 
effects  in both  the interwar  and  postwar  eras,  but that the  persistence 
properties  of those  real effects are very different in the two periods. 
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reading  committee  to vet  the  study.  The Romers' work  in essence  is a 
staff reading committee's  report even  though  it comes  25 years after the 
publication of A Monetary History. We had many comments  from readers 
of the  manuscript  a quarter of a century  ago,  and  the final version  re- 
flects additions  and revisions  we  made  in response.  One  director, who 
had  reservations  about  our  criticism of  Federal Reserve  policy  during 
1930-33,  chose  to have his "questioning  comment" included  in the pub- 
lished  volume.  That can't be changed  now, but we are certainly ready to 
learn whatever  useful  lessons  the new  reading committee  can teach us. 
The Romers' report reexamines  the selection  of four episodes,  all pre- 
dating World War II, when  in our view  actions of the monetary authori- 
ties  were  independent  of  contemporary  changes  in  output  and  were 
associated  with  subsequent  contractions  in economic  activity. The Rom- 
ers' verdict,  however,  is that the  evidence  for the period  before World 
War II that  monetary  disturbances  had  real effects  is  not  conclusive. 
Their reason is that "there is so much variation in monetary institutions, 
in the theoretical  framework  adhered  to by central bankers,  and in the 
particulars of important monetary  episodes  in the interwar period." 
For the Romers,  the postwar  era is a better laboratory for testing  the 
real effects  of monetary  disturbances.  They find "important similarities 
across  major monetary  episodes"  because  "the Federal Reserve  in the 
postwar  era has  had  a reasonably  stable view  of the functioning  of the 
economy  and the role of monetary  policy." At a later point I shall ques- 
tion the relevance  of the distinction  the Romers draw between  the sup- 
posed  constancy  of the institutional  framework since World War II and 
the supposed  prior instability. 
I propose  to discuss  first the Romers' identification  of postwar  mone- 
tary shocks  and then  to respond  to their challenge  to the independence 
of the monetary  shocks we identified  in A Monetary  History. Before doing 
so,  let me  record my  agreement  with  them  that evidence  for a period 
other than the one we  relied on is important.  Likewise,  evidence  from a 
country other than the United States would  be important. 
The money-output  link that is the focus of the Romers' inquiry is limited 
to the real effects  of contractionary monetary  policy. It is not clear, how- 
ever, why  they  should  not have  included  shocks  when  the Fed deliber- 
ately  adopted  expansionary  monetary  policy  in  order  to  increase  the 
growth  of  output.  That money-output  link  would  have  increased  the 
sample  of shocks  they  test.  They defend  their decision  to focus only on 
negative  shocks by reason of the difficulty "to distinguish  any real effects 
of expansionary  shifts  from whatever  natural recovery  mechanism  the 
economy  may  have."  But as they  themselves  comment,  "the economy 
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be easier to distinguish  any real effects of contractionary shifts from what- 
ever natural slump  mechanism  is inherent  in the economy? 
To identify  monetary  shocks in the postwar period, the Romers rely on 
statements  in the "Record of Policy Actions"  of the Board of Governors 
and the Federal Open Market Committee  and, until their discontinuance 
in  1976,  the  minutes  of  FOMC  meetings,  that  indicated  a  degree  of 
concern about inflation  sufficient  to move  the authorities to "attempt to 
induce  a recession  (or at least a 'growth recession')."  The Romers desig- 
nate six such  episodes  between  October 1947 and October 1979 as inde- 
pendent  monetary  disturbances.  They exclude  the credit crunch of 1966 
because  their  reading  of  the  record  is  that  the  Fed  was  not  actively 
attempting  to  induce  a downturn.  Why  could  the  Fed  not  have  pro- 
duced  a downturn  even  if it was  not actively attempting  to induce  one? 
Why was the mini-recession  of 1966-67  not the work of Fed policy, even 
if not intended? 
The Romers'  procedure  prompts  two  questions.  Why  examine  what 
the Fed said rather than the monetary  actions they took? Economists are 
wary  of  accepting  statements  of  what  agents  say  they  do  or will  do; 
revealed  preferences  are  usually  regarded  as  more  reliable.  The  best 
indicator of the Federal Reserve's  actions is the growth of high-powered 
money.  Why in the postwar  period  should  the Romers have  eschewed 
that  indicator  of  independent  monetary  disturbances?  According  to 
them,  what  they  call the "narrative approach" that we  used  in A Mone- 
tary History is also their approach.  But note that we highlighted  actions of 
the monetary  authorities  that in our view  were independent  of contem- 
porary changes  in output,  not statements  of intentions  or beliefs. 
The Romers justify  ignoring  movements  of the monetary base on the 
ground  that "in many  of the episodes  it [the Federal Reserve] was  rela- 
tively  unconcerned  with  the  monetary  base."  Whether  or not  the  Fed 
was  concerned,  if there were  actions  to back up its intentions  to accept 
output losses,  as the Romers contend,  is it conceivable that the monetary 
base would  remain unaffected? 
The Romers  could  have  applied  one  of their statistical tests  to judge 
whether  the shocks  they selected  in fact were matched by a downturn  in 
high-powered  money  growth: first, a simple univariate forecast equation 
of high-powered  money  growth  with  24 own  lags and a set of seasonal 
dummy  variables,  and then a dynamic  forecast of high-powered  money 
change  for the 36 months  following  the six shocks.  The differences  be- 
tween  these  forecasts  and  the  actual behavior  of high-powered  money 
change would  confirm or reject the episodes  they chose.  They could also 
have checked their decisions  not to classify 1966 and 1975-78 as indepen- 
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A  second  question  is  why,  granted  that  the  Fed would  like to curb 
inflation,  one should  believe  that the actions they take are adequate and 
well-timed?  The  Romers'  discussion  of their choice  of August  1978 as 
one  of  the  cases  of  independent  monetary  disturbances  exposes  the 
reason  for  doubting  the  validity  of  their  procedure.  They  report  in- 
creases  in discount  rates from August  to November  1978 and from July 
to  September  1979,  and  increases  in  reserve  requirements  and  in  the 
Federal  funds  rate.  Their  summary  is:  "During  this  period  almost  all 
questions  about  the  conduct  of monetary  policy  were  resolved  on  the 
side  of tightness."  On  the  contrary, every  one  of those  actions  can be 
regarded as consistent  with an easy money  policy, since each action was 
milder than was required to offset other factors making for a higher level 
of market rates. 
The Romers  offer two  kinds  of evidence  to support  their conclusion 
that  recessions  in  fact  followed  the  six  identified  cases  of  a  Fed- 
engineered  monetary  disturbance.  They  deem  one  kind of evidence  to 
be "informal," the other statistical. To my mind,  however,  both kinds of 
evidence  the  Romers  offer is quantitative.  The only  informal matter in 
the paper is the narrative evidence  for selecting  monetary  shocks. 
The  so-called  informal  evidence  is  that  the  downturn  in  economic 
activity following  each of the six cases cannot be predicted from the past 
behavior  of forecasting  equations  estimated  over the entire postwar  pe- 
riod  for industrial  production  and  unemployment.  As  I have  already 
indicated,  the  forecasting  equations  include  a set  of  seasonal  dummy 
variables  and  24  own  lags  that  are  intended  to  capture  the  "normal 
dynamics" of the series.  They then construct what they call a "dynamic" 
forecast of both the percentage  change  in industrial production  and the 
level of the unemployment  rate for the 36 months  following  each shock. 
The differences  between  these  forecasts and actual behavior are plotted 
over  the  three-year  horizon.  Except  for the  industrial  production  plot 
following  the  October  1947 shock,  which  begins  in February 1948, the 
rest of the plots begin  in the month  following  the shock. 
The Romers conclude  that on each of the six occasions  in the postwar 
years  that the  Federal Reserve  attempted  to cause  a recession  to lower 
inflation,  it succeeded.  The "recessions"  that are depicted  in the plots, 
however,  are not  the recessions  that the NBER business  cycle chronol- 
ogy defines.  Consider  the first two  shocks  the Romers identify: October 
1947 and  September  1955. The corresponding  business  cycle peak and 
trough  dates  are November  1948-October  1949 and August  1957-April 
1958. In the  first of these  contractions,  industrial production  reached  a 
peak  in  July  1948 and  a  trough  in  October  1949; in  the  second,  the 
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According  to  the  plots,  however,  the  first negative  discrepancy  be- 
tween  the forecast and actual industrial production,  following  the Octo- 
ber 1947 shock,  occurred in January 1949, and  the largest negative  dis- 
crepancy in June 1949. The actual value does not match the forecast until 
June 1950, although  by April 1950, the index exceeded  its peak value in 
July 1948. Similarly, following  the September  1955 shock,  the first nega- 
tive  discrepancy  between  the  forecast  and  actual industrial  production 
does  not occur until October 1957, and the largest, until April 1958. The 
actual value never  matches  the forecast over the horizon of the plot. 
One question  therefore is, what is the relationship between  the reces- 
sions the Romers see in their plots and the recessions  of common  experi- 
ence?  The most  troublesome  aspect  of this part of their work  arises in 
connection  with  the last two  of their shocks,  August  1978 and October 
1979. The corresponding  business  cycle peak and trough dates are Janu- 
ary 1980-July  1980 and July 1981-November  1982. The index  of indus- 
trial production  reached a peak in March 1979 and a trough in July 1980, 
and the following  peak in July 1981 and trough in November  1982. The 
plots  following  the two  shocks,  however,  both begin to record negative 
discrepancies  between  the forecast and actual values  in April 1980. Are 
both  shocks  operating  at this date? The consumer  credit restraints that 
the Fed announced  in March 1980 is a shock that this work ignores. 
The Romers interpret their misnamed  informal evidence  as indicating 
that nominal  disturbances  have  highly  persistent  effects  on  output.  Is 
such  an  interpretation  consistent  with  the  postwar  record of business 
cycle  contractions  with  an  average  duration  of  eleven  months?  The 
Romers' response  (in a private communication)  is that, according to their 
Figure 1, "the economy  often  does  not return quickly to the path that it 
appeared  to be on prior to the recession"; hence  their finding  that "the 
real effects of monetary  shocks are highly persistent."  Relating the trend 
rate of growth  of the unemployment  rate shown  in the figure to mone- 
tary shocks  strikes me as myopic,  given  conditions  in labor markets that 
are independent  of monetary  shocks. 
The  second  kind  of evidence  that the  Romers  offer to support  their 
conclusion  that output  declined  and unemployment  rose following  each 
of their monetary  shocks  is based  on  the following  test.  To the  simple 
univariate forecasting equations  for industrial production and unemploy- 
ment,  they add current and 36 lagged values  of a dummy variable that is 
equal  to one  in each  of the  six months  of a monetary  disturbance  and 
zero  in  all other  months.  They  judge  the  response  of both  industrial 
production  and unemployment  to the dummy  variable by summing  the 
coefficients  for various lags.  They report that over all 36 lags,  the sum is Comment  -175 
negative  for  industrial  production  and  positive  for  unemployment, 
large, and statistically significant,  with the main impact of the dummy  at 
between  12 and  24 lags  for industrial  production  (somewhat  later for 
unemployment).  They  measure  the  impulse  response  function  of  the 
estimated  equations  as the combined  effect of a unit shock to the dummy 
variable and the feedback effect through lagged output and lagged unem- 
ployment.  They conclude  that monetary  shocks not only have large real 
effects,  confirming  the results of their informal test, but, in addition,  the 
effects  are long  lasting.  My question  again  is,  should  not  the  postwar 
period  have  been  characterized  by  long,  deep  recessions,  instead  of 
mild, brief ones,  given  the number of monetary shocks the Romers have 
identified? How  does  one reconcile the statistical results with the facts of 
cyclical experience? 
Nevertheless,  even  if I do not agree with their procedure for choosing 
specific  dates  for anti-inflationary  shifts  in  Fed  policy,  the  exercise  in 
itself is intelligent,  and the evidence  the Romers have devised  is highly 
imaginative.  In particular, they  rule out  supply  shocks,  inflation  itself, 
and fiscal policy as driving their results.  With respect to fiscal policy, the 
Romers  test  whether  fiscal  policy  might  have  changed  to  match  the 
timing of monetary  policy by adding  to their regressions  the current and 
first 12 lags of the quarterly change  in the ratio of the nominal  govern- 
ment  budget  surplus  to nominal  GNP. They find that "the response  of 
the  real economy  to  monetary  shocks  can not  be  ascribed  to  possible 
correlations  of  monetary  disturbances  with  government  spending." 
Should  this  result be  seen  as a confirmation  of the St. Louis equation? 
Let me now  turn to the challenge  the Romers pose  to the selection  of 
independent  monetary  shocks that we cited in A Monetary  History. At the 
time  A  Monetary History was  published  the  money-output  link  was 
hardly a mainstream  doctrine.  In a paradox that Axel Leijonhufvud  has 
commented  on,  those  who  initially  dismissed  the  notion  of a link be- 
tween  monetary  change  and output  change are now its fervent support- 
ers, while  many  of those  who  initially upheld  the validity of a link now 
insist on the neutrality of money.  The former are keen to offset putative 
contractionary fiscal policies  by expansionary  monetary policies; the lat- 
ter would  ignore monetary  change  altogether. 
The  possibility  of  bias  in  our  selection  of  monetary  shocks  arises, 
according  to  the  Romers,  because  we  omitted  independent  negative 
monetary  disturbances  that would  have  been  included  had  they  been 
followed  by significant  declines  in money  and output,  such as the bank- 
ing failures at the end of 1932 and early 1933, and the increase in reserve 
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the stock market crash, which  we ordinarily would  have associated  with 
positive  output  effects,  but which  did not occur. 
As for the episodes  we  selected,  only two qualify in the Romers' view 
as "a monetary  disturbance  at all"-the  discount  rate hikes by the Fed in 
1920 and 1931 following  Britain's departure from gold. The third episode 
we  selected-the  1936-37  increases  in reserve  requirements-they  find 
ambiguous.  The evidence  from the early stages of the Great Depression 
is  again  not  clear cut  in  their  view.  Moreover,  in  all the  episodes  we 
selected,  they  characterize non-monetary  forces "to have been  strongly 
contractionary." Hence  the Romers' conclusion  that the pre-World War II 
evidence  linking money  to output  at best is weak. 
I could  dispute  each  of the  allegations  by the  Romers.  For example, 
they  assert  that it was  only  in December  1937, seventeen  months  after 
the first increase in reserve requirements  was announced,  that there was 
a discernible change  in the behavior of reserves as a fraction of deposits. 
In  my  reading  of  the  numbers,  from  a  low  point  in  June  1936,  two 
months  before  the  imposition  of  the  first increase  in  reserve  require- 
ments,  the fractions rose thereafter until mid-1940. But I see no point in 
challenging  each  of  the  Romers'  doubts  about  our selection  of crucial 
experiments. 
The reason is that when  they regress the monthly  change in industrial 
production  on  24  own  lags,  a  set  of  monthly  dummy  variables,  and 
current and  36 lagged  values  of a dummy  variable showing  monetary 
shocks,  whether  the shocks are the altered set they prefer or our original 
set,  the  results  confirm  a depressing  effect  of money  on  output.  They 
conclude  that we  may  have  been  biased  in our classification  of shocks, 
but bias does  not account for the outcome  that money  matters. 
Finally, I am not convinced  that the Romers' belief in the institutional 
stability of the Fed post-World  War II and variability earlier is justified. 
The big changes  earlier were  the establishment  of the Fed itself and the 
considerable  attentuation  of gold  standard constraints  thereafter. In the 
post-World  War II period,  the  Fed  has  operated  with  a succession  of 
techniques  and  policies:  bills only, twisting  the yield  curve,  manipulat- 
ing the Phillips  curve,  responding  to balance of payments  movements, 
administering  credit controls,  responding  to exchange  rate movements, 
etc.  Institutional  change  during  the  period  A Monetary History covers 
was  something  we  took for granted.  What we  found  invariant was  the 
relationship  between  money  and  output.  Results  are more  robust  the 
wider,  not  the  narrower,  the  range  of  institutional  circumstances  on 
which  they are based,  contrary to the Romers' view. 
Let me conclude  by saying  that despite  my reservations  the Romers' 
report is well worth  studying. Comment 177 
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BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN 
Harvard  University 
Christina Romer and David Romer's historical investigation  of the effect 
of monetary policy on real economic  activity is, in some ways,  very much 
in the spirit of Friedman and Schwartz's classic monetary history. In other 
ways,  both the methodology  and the findings  of the Romer and Romer 
paper run counter to the central thrust of Friedman and Schwartz's work. 
Methodology:  Narrative  History  and  Statistical  Apparatus 
Romer  and  Romer  address  not  only  a  familiar question  of  economic 
behavior-do  central bank actions affect real output?-but  also an impor- 
tant issue  of research  methodology:  How  should  economists  go  about 
answering  this question?  In particular, is the narrative historical method 
useful  for  this  line  of  inquiry?  Is  it  perhaps  superior to  the  standard 
approach based  on statistical testing  of time series data, which in recent 
decades  has come  to dominate  research in this area? Indeed,  in light of 
the  economics  profession's  failure to  resolve  questions  about  whether 
and how  monetary  policy  affects real output,  despite  several decades  of 
ever  more  sophisticated  and  more  intensive  manipulation  of the  stan- 
dard macroeconomic  time series, is research grounded in historical narra- 
tive the only methodology  likely to provide  persuasive  answers? Romer 
and  Romer,  without  explicitly  stating  that  no  other  methodology  can 
provide  convincing  answers,  argue  that  the  evidence  they  present 
stands  in sharp contrast to the notoriously  flimsy product  delivered  by 
statistical exercises  relying on time series data alone. 
Wholly apart from the merits of Romer and Romer's claim in the context 
of monetary  policy  and  real output,  the  renewed  interest  in historical 
narrative-motivated  in large part by dissatisfaction  with the cumulative 
results  of  the  more  statistically  oriented  research  methods  that  have 
mostly displaced  it from the toolkit of modern scholarship-is  not unique 
to economists.  In his 1981 presidential  address to the American Historical 
Association,  for example,  Bernard Bailyn described  the loss  due  to the 
passing  of the narrative method  from vogue  in this way: "Narratives that 
once gave meaning  to the details have been undermined  and discredited 
with  the  advance  of technical  scholarship,  and no new  narrative struc- 
tures have  been  constructed  to replace the old.  Few historians  even  at- 
tempt now to incorporate the mass of technical findings and the analytical 
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the  . . . relevance  and significance  of the technical writings  can only be 
found  within  and  as  part  of  such  comprehensive,  developmental  ac- 
counts."'  Clearly economists  are not  alone,  either in feeling  a sense  of 
frustration in the failure of modern  statistical technology  to provide per- 
suasive  answers  to long-standing  questions,  or in the hope  that a revival 
of narrative historical methods  may be helpful in this regard. Romer and 
Romer's reliance on historical narrative constitutes  a major similarity be- 
tween  their work and Friedman and Schwartz's. 
Nevertheless,  it is startling to read Romer and Romer's assertion-in 
the  very  first paragraph  of their paper-that  "This approach  was  pio- 
neered by Friedman and Schwartz in their Monetary  History of the United 
States . . .  " The  tradition  of  using  historical  narratives  to  draw  infer- 
ences about how  monetary  disturbances  affect the economy  goes back at 
least as far as the "Digression  Concerning  the Variations in the Value of 
Silver During  the  Course  of the Last Four Centuries,"  which  took up a 
sizable  chunk  of  Adam  Smith's  Wealth of Nations (1776).  Early works 
along these  same lines  that are more familiar on today's student  reading 
lists  include  Henry  Thornton's  Enquiry into the Nature and Effect of the 
Paper  Credit of Great Britain Together  with the Evidence  (1802) and Thomas 
Tooke's  History of Prices and of the State of Circulation (1838).  Notable 
British works  within  the  twentieth  century but certainly prior to Fried- 
man  and  Schwartz's  contribution  include  Keynes'  Indian Currency and 
Finance (1913), the section  on "Historical Illustrations" in Keynes's  Trea- 
tise on Money (1930),  Sayers's  Bank of England Operations (1936),  Clap- 
ham's classic history of the Bank of England (1945) and Clay's biography 
of Montagu  Norman  (1957). American  works in this vein  that also pre- 
ceded  Friedman and Schwartz  include  Sprague's  History of Crises Under 
the National Banking Systems (1910), Hamilton's  American  Treasure  and the 
Price Revolution in  Spain (1934),  Schumpeter's  Business Cycles (1939)- 
which  bore the  subtitle  "A Theoretical,  Historical and  Statistical Analy- 
sis" (emphasis  added)-and  Chandler's  biography  of Benjamin Strong 
(1958). 
The  methodological  innovation  introduced  by  Friedman  and 
Schwartz's  Monetary History  was  not  its  use  of  historical  narrative, 
which  these  and  other  authors  had  been  applying  to  the  analysis  of 
monetary  disturbances  for nearly 200 years,  but its use  of that method 
in  conjunction  with  a  formal  statistical  apparatus-in  particular,  the 
NBER reference  cycle concept,  as initially developed  by Wesley Mitchell 
and  subsequently  refined  by  Burns,  Moore,  Zarnowitz,  and  others. 
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Here  too,  Romer and  Romer's work  is similar to that of Friedman and 
Schwartz,  in that the  Romer and  Romer paper likewise  bases  its infer- 
ences  not just on  historical  narrative but on  the narrative used  in con- 
junction with  a specific  statistical apparatus. 
The  central  intellectual  organizing  principle  of  Romer  and  Romer's 
paper  (although  they  never  acknowledge  it  as  such)  is  the  vector 
autoregression.  The purpose  to which  they apply  their historical narra- 
tive is, in their words,  "the identification  of 'monetary shocks'  "-that  is, 
"to identify  episodes  when  there were large shifts in monetary policy or 
in the behavior  of the banking  system  that were not driven by develop- 
ments  on the real side of the economy."  And what do Romer and Romer 
do with  their list of monetary  shocks,  once they have identified  it? "The 
test  of  whether  monetary  disturbances  matter  is  then  simply  to  see 
whether  output  is unusually  low  following  negative  shocks  of this type 
and unusually  high  following  positive  shocks." 
If all this sounds  like what  a vector autoregression  is supposed  to do, 
that is because  it is what  a vector autoregression  is supposed  to do.  In- 
deed,  both  the graphical evidence  and the statistical tests  presented  by 
Romer and  Romer address  precisely  the  same  question  that Sims  first 
addressed  using a bivariate vector autoregression:  In Romer and Romer's 
words,  "If actual activity is less than one would  expect on the basis of the 
univariate  forecast following  monetary  shocks,  this would  suggest  that 
the change in Federal Reserve policy caused  real activity to be lower than it 
otherwise  would  have been" (emphasis  added).  Even the regression un- 
derlying  the formal statistical tests,  as specified  in equation  (1), has the 
typical form of one  element  of a vector autoregression-and  for just the 
same reason. The role of the 24 lagged values of the dependent  variable is, 
as usual,  to enable the regression  to determine whether  the independent 
variable has explanatory power beyond  that contained in the prior history 
of the dependent  variable itself.  Apart from the somewhat  unusual  lag 
structure, the only difference  between  the Romer-Romer regression  and 
standard bivariate vector autoregressions  linking  output  and money,  or 
unemployment  and money,  is the use here of the time series that Romer 
and Romer constructed  from their historical narrative, in place of some 
measure  of the quantity of money  or its growth  rate. 
Behavior:  Monetary  Policy,  Monetary  Disturbances,  and  Money 
The substitution  of a dummy  variable, constructed out of historical narra- 
tive, for any of the conventional  monetary  time series is not only central 
to Romer  and  Romer's  methodological  approach;  it is fundamental  to 
their substantive  findings  about economic  behavior.  And in this impor- 180 *  FRIEDMAN 
tant respect,  the conclusion  offered by Romer and Romer differs sharply 
from that of Friedman and Schwartz. 
Romer and  Romer motivate  their use  of historical narrative, and  the 
constructed time series stemming  from it, primarily as a matter of method- 
ology:  Vector autoregressions  have  been  unsuccessful  in  determining 
whether or not money  affects output.  A major part of the reason is the old 
question  of "what is driving what" when  two economic variables move in 
conjunction,  even  when  a time lag appears  to separate these  co-move- 
ments.2 Non-quantitative  evidence,  like minutes of Federal Open Market 
Committee  discussions,  can help resolve  this question.  And so on. 
But surely a further motivation  for Romer and Romer's crucial reliance 
on their constructed  dummy  variable in place of some  standard mone- 
tary time  series  is  that-Friedman  and  Schwartz  to  the  contrary-no 
single measure  of money  appears capable of representing  the aspects  of 
monetary policy actions  that matter for purposes  of this inquiry. 
No  reader of Friedman and Schwartz's  book could fail to understand 
two basic conclusions  of their work. First, monetary policy actions taken 
by  the  central  bank  systematically  affect  real  economic  activity  and 
prices.  And  second,  money  provides  a sufficient  statistic for the mone- 
tary policy actions  that the central bank takes, in that fluctuations  in the 
quantity of money  (or its growth  rate) tell most if not all of what can be 
told about  the  effects  on  output  and  prices that those  monetary  policy 
actions have. 
No reader of Romer and Romer's paper could fail to grasp their conclu- 
sion  that monetary  policy  actions  taken by the central bank systemati- 
cally affect real output.3  But an unsuspecting  reader might  well  fail to 
register  the  significance  of the  paper's  omission-indeed,  the authors' 
outright eschewal-of  any effort to show  that the quantity of money  or 
its growth  rate captures  the  aspects  of monetary  policy  that matter in 
this regard. In fact, Romer and Romer's historical narrative not only does 
not emphasize  measures  of money  in identifying  the episodes  that qual- 
ify  as  "monetary  shocks"  but,  in  the  case  of  some  episodes,  fails  to 
mention  money  at all.4 
2. An early exposition  of these  difficulties  which  is still valuable  is James Tobin, "Money 
and Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc." Quarterly  Journal  of Economics.  84. May, 1970. 
301-17. 
3. Effects on prices are not part of their investigation. 
4. Two elements  of Romer and Romer's choice of episodes  for the postwar period require, 
at the least, more justification than they provide here. The first is the exclusion of 1966 as 
a "monetary  shock."  It is highly  likely  that President  Johnson's  harsh  reaction to the 
December  1965 discount  rate increase  resulted  in Federal Reserve  System  documents 
that understated  the  degree  to which  monetary  policy  was  actively  moving  to combat 
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Unfortunately,  Romer and Romer's choice  of language-in  particular, 
their repeated  use  of the  ambiguous  label "monetary disturbances,"  or 
"monetary  shocks,"  to refer to the episodes  of central bank action that 
they single  out from their historical narrative-blurs  this distinction  and 
therefore  increases  the  likelihood  that readers may miss  the important 
contrast between  their findings  and Friedman and Schwartz's.  After all, 
in much  of the literature investigation  whether  monetary  policy  affects 
output,  "monetary disturbances"  are conventionally  measured  by some 
monetary  quantity.  Here that is simply  not the case.  As a result,  when 
Romer and Romer report, for example,  that "extremely narrowly defined 
monetary disturbances  account for a considerable fraction of fluctuations 
in postwar  economic  activity," the reader must be alert to the absence of 
any  demonstrated  connection  between  these  "extremely  narrowly  de- 
fined monetary  disturbances"  and fluctuations  in the stock of money  or 
its growth  rate.5 
Further,  Romer  and  Romer's  use  of  the  historical  narrative  to  con- 
struct  their  time  series  to  represent  the  independent  movements  of 
monetary  policy  runs  strongly  counter  to  the  thrust  of  Friedman  and 
Schwartz's  contribution  in  yet  another  way.  While  there is nothing  in 
Friedman  and  Schwarz's  work  to  suggest  that  fluctuations  in  money 
growth  have  asymmetrical  effects depending  on whether  they are posi- 
tive  or negative,  Romer  and  Romer identify  only  negative shocks.  The 
time series  that they  use  in their formal statistical tests correspondingly 
assumes  values  limited  to zero and  minus one.  It is always  possible,  of 
course,  to  rationalize  this  representation  by  arguing  that  the  central 
bank  could  have  chosen  to  conduct  monetary  policy  in  a  way  that 
would  have  amounted  to  a  positive  shock,  but-even  over  a period 
spanning  more  than  six decades-simply  never  did  so.  The net  result 
of  this  choice,  however,  is  that  Romer and  Romer's  representation  of 
monetary  policy has the pre-Friedman-Schwartz  character of a string on 
which  the central bank can pull but not push. 
Similarity  and  Contrast 
In the end,  therefore,  whether  the Romer and Romer paper reinforces or 
undercuts  the Friedman-Schwartz  book is mostly  a matter of what is at 
issue.  On  the  methodological  question  of  what  set  of  tools  can  best 
support  investigation  of  the  links  between  monetary  policy  and  eco- 
nomic  activity, both  works  not  only  begin  from a strong  presumption 
5. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising  that Romer  and Romer  never report  even the simple 
correlation  between their time series representing "monetary  disturbances"  and any 
familiar  measure  of money or the monetary  base. 182  DISCUSSION 
favoring the use of narrative history in conjunction with statistical analy- 
sis but also go on to demonstrate  the validity of that presumption.  And 
on  the  behavioral  question  of  whether  monetary  policy  systematically 
affects real output,  both works answer  a decisive  "yes." 
But  on  the  question  that  bears  most  directly  on  practical issues  of 
monetary  policy-specifically,  whether  fluctuations  in  the  quantity  of 
money  or its growth  rate can serve as a reliable center focus of monetary 
policy  making-Romer  and  Romer not only  offer no support  for Fried- 
man and Schwartz's  "yes" but, indeed,  adopt a methodology  implicitly 
motivated  by the presumption  that the answer  is really "no." 
Discussion 
David  Romer responded  to Schwartz's  discussion  by emphasizing  that 
they were  interested  in the intent  of the Fed more than its actual policy 
outcomes.  He  noted  as well  that the recessions  identified  in the paper 
correspond  well  to the NBER dating.  Finally, he asserted that the stabil- 
ity of monetary  regimes  in the  postwar  period  made  it a more natural 
time to test for the effects of monetary  policy. 
Bennett  McCallum  questioned  whether  the  shocks  identified  in  the 
paper  were  truly  exogenous,  since  they  were  all intended  to  reduce 
inflation.  Christina Romer responded  that the shocks were exogenous  to 
the state of the real economy,  and that one identifying  assumption  made 
in the paper is that steady-state  changes  in the level of inflation have no 
real effects. 
Laurence  Ball asked  why  monetary  policy  shocks  had  such  long  ef- 
fects  on  output  and  unemployment.  David  Romer indicated  that they 
did not  examine  the  propagation  mechanism  in this paper, but merely 
documented  the evidence. 
Robert Gordon  wondered  whether  the  monetary  policy  shocks  just 
ratified recessions  that would  already occur. He speculated  that the high 
interest rates associated  with high inflation might have caused the reces- 
sion,  independent  of  the  Federal  Reserves  actions.  Robert Hall  ques- 
tioned several aspects  of the results.  First, he noted that the t-statistic on 
the difference  between  output  eighteen  months  after a monetary  policy 
shock and output  unconditional  on the shocks  was  only about  -2.  Sec- 
ond,  since  the authors  knew  the path of output  and unemployment  in 
the post-war  period,  it was unlikely  that the identification  of shocks was 
truly unbiased.  Third, the Federal Reserve is also a regulatory and fiscal 
policy  body,  in addition  to a monetary  authority. Thus,  it is difficult to 
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determine  what aspect of Federal Reserve behavior affects output.  David 
Romer responded  that the common  policy response  across all the shocks 
was open market operations,  indicating that it may be the money  supply 
that affects output. 
Michael Bordo noted  that Friedman and Schwartz identified  money  as 
an exacerbating  factor in business  cycle fluctuations,  not an exogenous 
event.  He  also  wondered  how  the  proposed  shock  in  1933 could  be 
differentiated  from  the  banking  holiday  and  the  other  policies  of  the 
Roosevelt  Administration.  Christina  Romer indicated  that measures  of 
fiscal policy  could  be  included  in  the  regressions  to  control  for these 
aspects. 
Olivier Blanchard suggested  that the authors use their series of mone- 
tary  policy  surprises  as  an  instrument  to  determine  whether  money 
supply changes  lead to changes  in output.  Christopher Sims agreed with 
this  suggestion.  Sims  also  indicated  that he  found  the  identifying  as- 
sumption  that trend inflation has no real effects unconvincing,  given the 
strong predictive  power  of short term interest rates for output.  Christina 
Romer indicated  that they  would  use  the series on monetary  shocks  as 
an instrument  in future research. 